# 1NC

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#### United States federal government means the three branches

OECD 87 — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987 (“United States,” *The Control and Management of Government Expenditure*, p. 179)

Political and organisational structure of government The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### National Health Insurance requires a national means of financing of health care

Wallace 80 – Helen M. Wallace, M.P.H. from Harvard University’s School of Public Health, M.D. from Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, directed public health programs at various large research universities, such as New York Medical College, University of Minnesota, University of California Berkeley, and San Diego State University (“National Health Insurance and Child Health Care,” *Journal of Public Health Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1980, pgs. 150-165, Available to Subscribing Institutions through JSTOR)

The terms national health insurance and national health service are often used synonymously, but in fact they have different meanings. National health insurance means the collection and distribution of funds to providers to defray the expenditures for health care. National health service means the system of delivery of care to recipients: the planning, pro- vision, and evaluation of health services (e.g., medical, dental, hospital, ambulatory, drugs, appliances); and responsibility for recruitment, educa- tion, training, and deployment of health personnel. National health insurance is essentially a bill-paying activity, but it can potentially influence the content and the emphasis of services

#### Topicality as a procedural constraint is necessary for effective debate

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

#### Two impacts -

#### 1) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg b/c debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### 2) Also key to have well-prepared opponents. They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### Also destroys mechanism education

#### Their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

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#### The 1AC’s homogenous theorizing of black relationality reflects an investment in failure rooted in a negative conception of identity. The horizon of this reactive politics is revenge, inflicting harm on the oppressor with no blueprint for collective liberation.

Brown 1995 (Wendy, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). pp. 69-71) \*Edited by Hemanth

Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction – the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds – and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought:

Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.

If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the ''imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. " This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as ~~he does~~" (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. "

But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection.' This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."

Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political failure ~~paralysis~~, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach - "punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical he it creates a good conscience for itself" than to find venues of self-affirming action.

#### The affirmative’s articulation of antiracist politics fails to produce social transformation by weaponizing accusations of past movement failure as a justification for refusing the egalitarian promise of revolutionary transformation

Reed 17 (Adolph, Jr, Prof of Political Science @ U of Pennsylvania, “Revolution as ‘National Liberation’ and the Origins of Neoliberal Antiracism,” Socialist Register 2017, ed. Gregory Albo and Leo Panitch, p. 299-322)

Whatever it may have been at earlier historical moments, antiracism as a contemporary politics is not necessarily aligned with projects of broad social transformation animated by the egalitarian vision that prompted the twentieth century’s iconic revolutions. Rather, antiracist politics in the United States and elsewhere in the West and much of Latin America can be, and often enough has been, an antagonistic alternative to such projects of broad transformation. That is, notwithstanding a persistent inclination among leftists to consider it a discourse at least in dialogue with the left, antiracism is as likely now to be an ideological and practical programme that fits more comfortably within neoliberalism than with a socialist left. In the United States especially, but increasingly in Western Europe and Canada also, antiracism and other political tendencies based on ascriptive identities – that is, those expressing what one supposedly is rather than what one does2 – commonly reject Marxist and other socialist politics as insufficiently attentive, if not inimical, to the special position and needs of racial or other ascriptively defined populations understood to be oppressed in ways that are not causally or most consequentially rooted in capitalist political economy. In fact, these tendencies commonly object to the universalizing perspectives associated with socialism and Marxism in particular as Eurocentric (or phallocentric, or heteronormative) homogenization that denies the specificity of ascriptive groups’ distinctive perspectives, grievances and demands. To the extent the political orientation from which antiracist and other identity-based tendencies proceed is more ‘groupist’ than broadly solidaristic, the vision of a just society around which they cohere can be more in line with liberal interest-group pluralism than with a left that relates its lineage or marks its affinities to the broad tradition that generated the revolutionary movements of the last century. Eric Hobsbawm pointed to this tension in the mid-1990s indicating that, while the left naturally has supported movements advocating for the rights of stigmatized groups, identity groups ‘are not committed to the Left as such, but only to get support for their cause wherever they can’.3 Openness to this kind of politics stems partly, as Hobsbawm points out, from the left reflex to support the cause of the oppressed. The victories won in the second half of the twentieth century against ideologies and regimes of ascriptive hierarchy, chiefly those grounded on narratives of race and gender, made leftists, and labour, all the more conscious of past failings with respect to inattentiveness to, acceptance or even overt embrace of ascriptive inegalitarianism. The generation of leftists who emerged in the 1960s came of age with the militant anti-colonial movements and national liberation struggles in what was then known as the Third World, the civil rights struggle in the United States, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa, as well as the resurgent women’s movement. That generation was also likely to be self-critical regarding what were perceived as failings and limitations – some would say ossification, even debasement or perversion – of the dominant practical models of socialism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere on the capitalist periphery. The New Left generation’s inclination to criticize ‘really existing socialism’ extended also to the orthodox Marxist parties in the West, which were easily enough seen as out of touch with the new spirit of insurgency coming from youth, minority groups in advanced capitalist societies, and Third World movements of national liberation. In the US, many displayed similar scepticism toward the trade union movement, which in the eyes of many radicals had settled into a narrow, self-interested class collaborationism. This is a familiar story to Socialist Register readers, and one I summarize very schematically. In addition to Hobsbawm’s account mentioned above, Leo Panitch and the late Ellen Meiksins Wood have discussed these developments more extensively, especially the impact of the intellectual left’s movement both into the academy and away from an intellectual and epistemic commitment to class struggle.4 Several features of that moment are pertinent for making sense of the subsequent development of antiracist politics in itself and the left’s embrace of it. Disillusionment with democratic centralism and sclerotic bureaucratism fed a skeptical attitude toward organizational and intellectual discipline, as well as toward commitment to specific visions and programmes of social transformation. Those tendencies became exacerbated over the 1980s and 1990s as left activity retreated increasingly into universities. In that climate, as more and more of the left came to be defined by moral stance rather than strategic politics and practical programme, self-criticism and atonement regarding racism and sexism on the part of labour and the left in the past, and bearing witness against injustice in the present, loomed steadily larger as an element of left political discourse, especially in the US. And then, with rote repetition of ever more deeply embedded commonsense knowledge, the narrative of labour’s and the left’s past failings with respect to racial and gender inequalities was increasingly shed of nuance, to the point that in recent decades it has become a truism in some activist circles that failure to challenge ascriptive inequalities, or even active reproduction of them, has been a definitive characteristic of the working-class-based left and trade unions, and is substantially responsible for the decline of either or both.5 Commitment to the accusatory narrative can underwrite extraordinary historical misrepresentation, for example, Eugene Debs’s statement that socialism has ‘nothing special to offer the Negro’ is taken as evidence of his indifference to racial inequality – when his intent was exactly the opposite.6 A left that had by and large given up the goal of radical social transformation and the objective of pursuing political power for the purpose of realizing that goal became less distinct from liberalism. Such a left, as Russell Jacoby notes, ‘ineluctably retreats to smaller ideas, seeking to expand the options within the existing society’.7 Militant embrace of the discourses of identity politics, most notably antiracism, has helped to sustain an appearance that the left is not in retreat but remains on the cutting edge of transformational politics. That is because of the prominence of a view that construes ‘oppressions’ rooted in race and gender, etc., as both foundational to American society – or the West – and so deeply embedded that most whites/men are in denial about their power. From that perspective the civil rights movement’s legislative victories in the 1960s were superficial and could not address the deep-structural sources of racism and sexism, which are effectively ontological and therefore beyond the reach of normal political or social intervention. Thus the struggle against these sources of inequality is always insurgent because their power never diminishes. CONTEMPORARY ANTIRACISM’S AHISTORICAL CHARACTER Representing racism as a transhistorical phenomenon, sometimes character- ized as a ‘national disease’ or ‘original sin’, underwrites a claim that it continues to shape life chances for blacks and other nonwhites as it did in earlier periods when, as W. E. B. Du Bois put it, ‘the walls of race were clear and straight; when the world consisted of mutually exclusive races; and even though the exact edges might be blurred there was no question of exact definition and understanding of the meaning of the word’, that is, when notions of racial hierarchy were hegemonic and were open and explicit principles of social and political organization.8 That view, to the extent that it understands racism as transcending patterns of historically specific social relations, presumes primordial understandings of race/racism as a phenomenon shared by both postwar racial liberalism and the earlier racial determinism it challenged. This is, moreover, a political problem as well as an intellectual one. The politics crafted in this antiracist framework has a rearguard character that is expressed in its proponents’ tendency to rely on evocation of past racist practices – law professor Michelle Alexander’s book *The New Jim Crow* is one prominent illustration9 – to mobilize outrage about injustices in the present. The argument by means of historical analogy, i.e., that current injustices that may seem to derive most directly from different, more complex sources are more significantly understood as like latter-day instances of racist practices in the past, rests on the trope that the current outrages demonstrate the deep continuity of racism as a force and at least suggests the inadequacy of the victories of the civil rights struggle. Yet that trope is also in effect an acknowledgment that big victories on that front have indeed been won. Otherwise there would be no basis for assuming that the comparison would have rhetorical force. Condemnation of an act or practice by comparing it to slavery or Jim Crow could provoke the desired effect only if we can assume consensus that slavery and Jim Crow were bad things. Moreover, sustaining the conviction that racism remains most significantly causal of contemporary patterns of inequality requires terminological gymnastics which enable positing racism – ‘institutional’, ‘structural’, even ‘post-racial’ – as, at least by default, the causal explanation for inequalities that appear statistically as racial disparity and are lived as such in day-to-day life. In fact, historical analogy typically stands in lieu of empirical argument to explain why we should automatically see contemporary disparities as evidence of the unspecified workings of a generic racism rather than as products of current and concrete political-economic processes that are very much ‘presentist’ elements of the regime of steadily intensifying regressive redistribution, the mechanisms, that is, that constitute the telos of neoliberalism. Assertion of the centrality of racist ideas and practices among labour and the left is similarly ahistorical both as a representation of the past and in its implications of continuity in the present. It is more allegory or fable than historical account. Presumptions, stances, and practices that now would be clearly recognized and negatively sanctioned as racist certainly were common enough in the Marxist left and the labour movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The appropriate basis of comparison – if one wants to make the sort of moral assessment that many critics of those institutions intend – would, however, not be early twenty-first century sensibilities, but whether racism and sexism were more prominent within unions and left politics than within other contemporaneous institutions. Frankly, from an historicist perspective this sort of exercise in moralistic calculation seems rather puerile, but, because antiracist criticisms of the left in the present depend so heavily on claims regarding the past, it is necessary to address them. Toward that end an important first step is recognizing that what race means and does not, how it has operated as a politically and ideologically potent category, as well as its meanings and significance, have evolved over time and context. The period of revolutionary ferment out of which the Bolshevik revolution emerged coincided with the historical moment when the race idea was at or approaching its apogee in the history of the world, before or since. At the beginning of the twentieth century race science identified between three and sixty-three ‘basic’ races in the world, including between three and six, or even thirty-six, in Europe alone.10 That ambiguity was the inevitable result of efforts to establish precise characteristics of a nonexistent phenomenon: ‘races’ simply do not exist as natural populations. Race theorists assumed that their efforts at taxonomic specification failed because generations of population movement and mixing had diluted original, ‘pure’ racial types; so they looked for racial essences beneath national or linguistic affiliations. This conviction in turn supported the manifestly unscientific approach of positing a priori ideal types and attempting to classify existing populations ‘racially’ by comparing the frequencies of geographical distribution of physical characteristics imputed to the ideal racial types constructed in the race scientists’ taxonomies.11 Marxists and other leftists were more likely to dissent from hegemonic racialism than others, but race-thinking permeated political and intellectual discourse and everyday common sense. It was reproduced among progressives, Fabians and many socialist reformers, as well as conservatives, in dominant notions of evolution as progress. Teleological presumptions about fixed stages of cultural and social evolution and the comparative method in Victorian anthropology that considered contemporary ‘primitives’ as living versions of ancestral Europeans reinforced the tendency – convenient for proponents of colonial expansion – to rank populations hierarchically on the basis of natural limits and capacities ascribed to them. And even many revolutionaries believed that colonial domination was justified because ‘backward’ peoples needed periods of tutelage to prepare them for the modern world. Many English race scientists were convinced that the indigenous working class was racially different from the aristocracy. Just as some socialists opposed imperialist expansionism on egalitarian grounds, others opposed it on racial grounds, expressing fear of degeneration through contact with racially inferior populations.12 Often class struggle was fought at least partly on the terrain of racialist ideology. In the latter half of the nineteenth century fights in the American West over importation of Chinese labour and Japanese immigration also centred around racialist ideologies. Railroad operators and other importers of Chinese labour imagined and openly asserted that those workers’ distinctive racial characteristics made them more tractable and able to live on less than white Americans; opponents, including the California labour movement, argued that those very racial characteristics would degrade American labour and that Chinese were racially ‘unassimilable’. But it was the employer class, not the workers likely to be displaced or impoverished, who established the debate on racial terms. Post-bellum southern planters imported Chinese to the Mississippi Delta region to compete with black sharecroppers out of the same racialist presumptions of greater tractability, as did later importers of Sicilian labour to Louisiana sugarcane and cotton fields.13 Large-scale industrial production in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on mass labour immigration mainly from the eastern and southern fringes of Europe. The innovations of race science – that is, of racialist folk ideology transformed into an academic profession – promised to assist employers’ needs for rational labour force management and were present in the foundation of the fields of industrial relations and industrial psychology. Hugo Münsterberg, a founding luminary of industrial psychology, included ‘race psychological diagnosis’ as an element in assessment of employees’ capabilities, although he stressed that racial or national temperaments are averages and considerable individual variation exists within groups. He argued that assessment, therefore, should be leavened with consideration of individuals’ characteristics and that the influence of ‘group psychology’ would be significant ‘only if the employment not of a single person, but of a large number, is in question, as it is most probable that the average character will show itself in a sufficient degree as soon as many members of the group are involved.’14 As scholarship on race science and its kissing cousin, eugenics, has shown, research that sets out to find evidence of racial difference will find it, whether or not it exists. Thus race science produced increasingly refined taxonomies of racial groups, and the apparent specificity of race theorists’ just-so stories about differential racial capacities provided rationales for immigration restriction, sterilization, segregation and other regimes of inequality and subordination, including genocide. It also generated practical applications to assist employers in assigning workers to jobs for which they were racially suited. A ‘racial adaptability’ chart used by a Pittsburgh company in the 1920s mapped thirty-six different racial groups’ capacities for twenty-two distinct jobs, eight different atmospheric conditions, jobs requiring speed or precision, and day or night shift work.15 Of course, all this was bogus, nothing more than narrow upper-class prejudices parading about as science. It was convincing only if one shared the folk narratives of essential hierarchy that the research assumed from the outset. But the race theories did not have to be true to be effective. They had only to be used as if they were true to produce the material effects that gave the ideology an authenticating verisimilitude. Poles became steel workers in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, and Gary, not for any natural aptitude or affinity but because employers and labour recruiters sorted them into work in steel mills. RACIALIST IDEOLOGY’S MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS As a significant social force, racialist ideology has always been anchored to material imperatives, in both domestic and international domains. It became commonsense truth to the extent that it connected with the perspectives and interests of powerful elites. Like all ideologies of ascriptive difference, it would pre-empt debate over evolving programmes of exploitation and domination by reading them into nature. While the discourse of white supremacy certainly has had no shortage of sincere adherents, it became hegemonic over the second half of the nineteenth century because it comported well with upper-class prejudices and capitalists’ economic programmes. That is how, as the Pittsburgh racial adaptability chart illustrates, it became the conceptual frame of reference within which other groups and strata came to understand their social position, articulate their own interests and thus constitute themselves practically as groups. In the US for instance, in the late 1830s and 1840s, in a context of rising abolitionist sentiment and the democratization of public discourse associated with the spread of universal (white male) suffrage, white supremacist ideology undergirded and propelled a shift in defences of slavery. Previously, pro-slavery arguments centred on defending the institution as a ‘necessary evil’, an unpleasant and even morally dubious requirement of the plantation- based economic order of the southern states. One antebellum planter put the matter succinctly: ‘For what purpose does the master hold the servant? Is it not that by his labor, he, the master, may accumulate wealth?’16 In the changing political climate, the rhetorical centre of gravity of defences of slavery shifted to an argument that the institution was indeed a positive good for all involved, including the enslaved. This moment coincided with the formation of the embryo of what by the end of the century would become race science. As the sectional crisis sharpened in the late 1840s and early 1850s, propagation of white supremacist ideology – both rhetorically and institutionally, through carrots and sticks – became important as a basis for accommodating non-slaveholding southern whites to the possibility of secession. Appeals to racial solidarity provided a narrative of political cohesion and negatively sanctioned dissent. To be clear, indicating that it had a material foundation is not to suggest that embrace of white supremacy was ‘purely’ instrumental, even among proto-race scientists and pro-slavery ideologues. An important feature of ideologies of ascriptive difference is that they hopelessly cloud the distinction between principled belief and pursuit of self-interest. Josiah C. Nott and George R. Gliddon, the authors of Types of Mankind, one of the most prominent texts of mid-nineteenth century race theory, both no doubt believed sincerely that the races they identified were equivalent to separate species and that blacks were naturally fit for enslavement. They were also, respectively, a wealthy slave-owning Alabama physician and an English Egyptologist who also wrote on the cotton economy in Egypt.17 A striking testament to the harmonizing power of ideology is the appearance of an antebellum field of slave medicine, devoted to identification and treatment of conditions peculiar to blacks. Among those was drapetomania, a ‘disease of the mind’ that afflicted slaves with an irrational inclination to ‘run away from service’. Samuel A. Cartwright, the slave-owning Louisiana physician who discovered and reported the malady in the early 1850s, when ‘positive good’ arguments had become dominant among slavery’s defenders, was convinced that he had identified a genuine medical condition, preposterously transparent as it seems to a twenty-first century sensibility.18 White supremacist ideology, and the racialism in which it was embedded, operated similarly, of course, in relation to European and American colonialism in the late nineteenth century. Pioneer sociologist Edward A. Ross in 1901 laid out an especially clear account that links scientific race theory, rooted in the neo-Lamarckian evolutionism common in the early social sciences, and an argument for imperialism and colonization as inexorable imperatives of the ‘vigorous’ races.19 In an illustration of the complex ways that hegemonic racialism could work, Ross had been fired from the Stanford University faculty the year before for having run afoul of Jane Lathrop Stanford, widow of Leland Stanford of the Union Pacific railroad and domineering force on the University’s board of trustees. Ross had earned Mrs Stanford’s ire for two particular transgressions: he militantly advocated, in league with trade unions, intensified enforcement of Chinese exclusion on racial grounds (Union Pacific was a principal proponent of importing Chinese labour, also on racial grounds); and he advocated with equal militancy public ownership of utilities.20 Rudyard Kipling, a literal product of British imperialism, extolled ‘The White Man’s Burden’, which – in a gush of enthusiasm at the US’s recent acquisitions from the Spanish- Cuban-American War – he urged Americans to take up. I am agnostic with respect to how earnestly Kipling held the brew of condescension dressed as altruism projected in his infamous contention. We can say with certitude, though, that he understood that there was much more to colonialism than altruistic tutelage. In response to Kipling, one of the most emphatic racists of the day in American politics, Democratic US Senator from South Carolina Benjamin R. ‘Pitchfork Ben’ Tillman, denounced imperialist expansionism on racial grounds, stressing concerns that sustained contact with inferior populations would lead to white racial degeneration.21 By the turn of the twentieth century racialist ideology had become a global frame of reference through which arguments about colonialism and economic and political hierarchy were commonly conducted. Therefore, it should not be surprising that opposition to those hierarchies would be expressed, at least initially, in that same language. An oft-cited instance of that perception is W. E. B. Du Bois’s 1903 observation that ‘the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colour line’, which he went on to specify as ‘the re lation of the darker and lighter races of men in Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea’.22 In the US, mass disfranchisement of blacks and imposition of strictly codified white supremacist apartheid in nearly all the South made the colour line particularly salient as a bulwark against egalitarian political interests. This is consistent with how ascriptive ideologies naturalize contingent material relations of inequality by making them invisible within narratives of fixed hierarchy. The racialized discourse of tutelage, persistence of the presumptions of the Victorian comparative method, and direct and overt racialized domination all reinforced a similar understanding of the driving impetus of colonialism. It was reasonable for egalitarian opponents to assume either that racialist ideology was the proximate source of the inequality and exploitation, or that combating that ideology was a necessary precondition for attacking the inequality. It is noteworthy that both in the US and in much of the fin-de-siècle colonial world, as Du Bois’s colour line apothegm illustrates, the first tentative expressions of modern political assertiveness from the dominated populations were formulated within the paradigm of tutelage of the underdeveloped. The nascent professional and functionary classes in the colonies and the American South, the ‘new men’, as Judith Stein describes them, began to yield a stratum who pursued advocacy for subordinate populations alongside managerial authority over, and organized guidance of, their progress toward self-government. In the US that stratum of racial advocates, often describing themselves as ‘race men’ and ‘race women’, attained civic voice in the context of mass disfranchisement and shared a commitment to the large ideal of ‘racial uplift’.23 This established a recognized social role and occupational niche for the race or ethnic group leader as a sort of freelance broker or ethnic-group entrepreneur. Booker T. Washington and Du Bois were prominent voices of this stratum. Both in the US and colonial territories this politics of group advocacy often rested on racialist presumptions about the subordinate populations’ general backwardness and the stewardship role the group’s more cultivated and advanced members should play in leading the masses out of their benighted state. This was a petition politics that addressed governing elites as its principal audience because it understood them to be the only source of e ective political agency. That meant as well that the mission of group uplift was defined within parameters set by the ruling class. By the 1930s racialist ideology was increasingly under attack on biological, anthropological, and political fronts, in part as an expression of the left’s social momentum, which helped to buttress and disseminate egalitarian ideas and sensibilities. In that environment, the Great Migration from the Jim Crow South to big cities in the North and Midwest encouraged popular mass politics among black Americans, particularly as black workers were incorporated into the new industrial unionism. Mass organization as a political form as well as trade unionism also spread through much of the colonial world. In both settings, insurgent politics understandably joined opposition to racism with opposition to exploitation, as defences of those hierarchical regimes still depended on racialist arguments and would continue to do so for several decades. But the cultural and ideological victory of egalitarianism over racialism that consolidated in post-Second World War intellectual life came with a very large asterisk. What was largely defeated was the historically specific strict bio-determinist discourse of race that had prevailed as common sense between the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. Walter Benn Michaels and Werner Sollors have shown that the retreat from race to culture in theories of social di erence that began in the 1920s was in some ways more an exchange of one metaphor of essential di erence for another than a rejection of the notion of essential group di erence. As historian of anthropology George Stocking, Jr points out, from its origins in the early twentieth century the modern culture idea never fully escaped race theory’s presumptions.24 In the postwar years, culture increasingly supplanted race in discourses legitimating inequality, particularly regarding exploitation of colonized societies and racial minorities in the US. In its taxonomy of ‘stages of development’, modernization theory in the academic study of comparative political development merely rehearsed hoary racialist accounts, such as that by E. A. Ross cited above, and the logic of the Victorian comparative method, while dressing them in a later generation’s scientistic raiment. Robert Vitalis has shown recently how the academic field and political practice of international politics in the US remained rooted in substantively racialist paradigms well into the 1960s.25 And the State Department’s and other national elites’ concerns about the impact that domestic civil rights agitation could have on US imperial designs in former colonial territories led to a concern with damage control that generated, on the one hand, censorship of news broadcast abroad and intense monitoring and policing of domestic activists’ overseas engagements and, on the other, liberal Cold Warriors’ pressure on the domestic front in support of some versions of the movement’s aims.26 AMBIGUITIES OF RACE AND CLASS IN POSTWAR INSURGENCIES Anti-colonial and national liberation movements also paid attention and to some extent drew inspiration from the postwar black American insurgency and vice versa. At least through the 1950s, movements on both planes of insurgency mobilized in general terms on a popular front basis. In both spheres – economic position and racial or national category – each signified the other. In the black American case, the postwar insurgency, which had germinated since the mid-1930s, incubated by industrial unionism and socialist agitation, was propelled partly by a tension between what Preston Smith characterizes as racial democratic (i.e., committed to radical equality of opportunity within American capitalism) and social democratic tendencies and programmes.27 Occasionally, the ultimate contradiction between those tendencies would erupt as open conflict around specific initiatives. However, in quotidian experience racial discrimination and subordination and economic exploitation and degradation seemed, and on one level were, elements in a singular system of oppression. For leftists in both loci of insurgency, pursuit of redistribution along racial and class lines each seemed to be a necessary condition for successful pursuit of the other, if they were not treated as indistinguishable. By the end of the Second World War, even very conventional black liberals and moderates were emphatic that continued growth of industrial unionism and expansion of public social wage policies were indispensable for black Americans’ advancement toward equality.28 For many, including activists, the social-democratic and racial-democratic imperatives were so tightly melded that, even on those occasions when tension between them erupted into explicit conflict in relation to specific initiatives, the sources of conflict typically were interpreted as deriving from individual, idiosyncratic di erences rather than more portentous ideological contradiction. A downside of the popular front style of politics, which was very successful through the major legislative victories of the mid-1960s, was that it proceeded from an abstract commitment to the interests of the race as a whole as a governing norm for political judgment, which was by definition murky and facilitated evasion of those sharp, potentially zero-sum disagreements over political vision that would surface in strategic or even tactical debates. This murkiness left many popular front black radicals ill- prepared for a critical moment in the mid-1960s when the submerged class contradiction sharpened in debate over ways forward after the legislative victories against segregation. THE CLASS CONTRADICTION That tension in black politics was at its core a class contradiction; racial democracy is the social ideal of the aspiring professional-managerial and business strata. Failure, inability or reluctance to address class dynamics in black politics as such, while understandable in the context of dynamic racial popular front insurgency as a strategic desideratum or even simple oversight, nonetheless has had consequences for subsequent understandings of the relation of race and politics and assertions of the scope of authentically black political interests that eventually undermined possibilities for sustaining a working-class agenda in black politics. Antagonistic reactions from both antiracist activists and political elites to Senator Bernie Sanders’s campaign for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, on a platform inspired by social democracy, threw into bold relief the extent to which what is now generally recognized as black politics is fundamentally a professional- managerial class programme that constitutes the left-wing of neoliberalism. This politics actively invokes the cultural authority of earlier moments of black insurgency, shorn of their working-class programmatic character, and spectres of the racial order it opposed, to align with a neoliberal ideal of social justice – parity in the distribution of capitalism’s costs and benefits among recognized ascriptive categories – as the boundary of the politically thinkable, even among a nominal left. This odd state of affairs is the product of several developments in postwar American politics, beginning with the impact of the business counterattack on labour in the years after the war and the aggressive anti-communism of the late 1940s and 1950s, and including the terms on which the victories of the mid-1960s were consolidated institutionally within black politics and the country at large. And, perhaps counter-intuitively, identification with Third World anti-colonial and national liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s played a significant role in rendering invisible the class dynamics that shaped the thrust and impact of post-segregation black politics. The decade after the end of the Second World War was a key moment in helping form the trajectory that has culminated in contemporary antiracist politics in the US. Two linked pressures, one suppressive and the other affirmative, shifted the balance in black popular front radicalism sharply in favour of the racial-democratic tendency. The reactionary anti- communist offensive of those years, as was its domestic intent, stigmatized and suppressed expressions of socialist or anti-capitalist politics or critique. Its effects on accelerating purges of the left from the labour movement are well known. Leah N. Gordon and Risa Golubo have examined its impact on the strategic orientation of black politics and racial advocacy.29 Crucially, aggressive, putschist anti-communism and its ‘loyalty’ apparatus drove a retreat from political-economic interpretations of the bases of racial inequality and toward an individualist, psychologistic perspective focused on racism as prejudice, bigotry, or intolerance. On the affirmative side of the ledger, that new racial liberalism divorced from political economy encouraged a litigation strategy of challenging the codified apartheid in the South as violating the guarantees of equal protection against discriminatory state action provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. By the mid-1940s the federal courts had shown that that direction could produce positive results for litigants, and that potential opening impelled a focus on the segregationist southern order and its infringements on the civil rights of blacks as a class of individuals. Of course, segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment no more in 1954, when the US Supreme Court found state-sponsored racially segregated education unconstitutional by definition, than it had in 1896, when the Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld codified segregation in the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. Moreover, black activists had fought against the segregationist regime with whatever means available since before Plessy had established it as legitimate. What had changed was the political and cultural centre of gravity with regard to racial inequality and discrimination. To be sure, the social-democratic tendency in black politics did not disappear. It remained an important engine of popular political action through the 1960s. The fabled 1963 March on Washington was organized principally by labour leader A. Philip Randolph’s Negro American Labor Council, and was officially called the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, organized and carried out with considerable trade union support. The impetus for the protest in Memphis at which Martin Luther King, Jr was assassinated was a sanitation workers’ strike that was an outcropping of a regional organizing campaign of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Labour and class-related issues were central to much of the militant action that made up the high period of southern civil rights activism from the 1940s through the 1960s, as well as a two-decade long struggle – mainly outside the South, where ruling-class dominance was too complete – for local, state, and federal Fair Employment Practices legislation. This would extend beyond anti-discrimination efforts to authorize public intervention in labour markets to pursue full employment, which had been a central goal of black political agitation – and the black-labour-left alliance in which it was embedded – since the war years. Even in the South, however, as the Memphis case illustrates, labour and class issues were often as not high on the movement’s agenda. Even such proceduralist liberal staples of the anti-segregation struggle as restoration of voting rights were linked in the minds of activists and rank-and-file movement supporters to working-class and labour objectives. NATIONAL LIBERATION, BLACK POWER AND CLASS POLITICS As Cold War liberalism and postwar racial liberalism converged, activists increasingly tended to link the civil rights agenda to the Cold War international agenda, especially regarding the decolonizing Third World, characterizing southern segregationists as out of step with world opinion and harmful to national security. Thus, at the same time as politically attentive black Americans drew inspiration from and inspired decolonization and national liberation movements abroad, many also found it at least instrumentally useful to identify their domestic struggles with US international aspirations. Not many perceived that there was a possible contradiction between those positions. Black Americans’ identification with anti-colonial struggles rested on an almost unavoidable and a ectively powerful sense of common, or at least comparable condition. I recall, on first seeing the film soon after its release, finding the ‘Battle of Algiers’ immensely resonant; it seemed that I had lived some of it as a child and adolescent in New Orleans and other American cities. But that general identification was also in important ways superficial and naïve, and it would eventually become implicated in the critical defeat of the social-democratic tendency in black politics in the late 1960s and 1970s. Black American Third Worldism was more nationalist than revolutionary. Going back to Du Bois’s apothegm about the colour line – and it is much less known that he essentially recanted it by the early 1950s, specifically describing race as an ‘excuse’ in class war30 – black identification with colonized populations stemmed partly from an idealized racial nationalism that presumed white supremacist constructions of the stakes of western imperialism. Du Bois’s 1928 novel Dark Princess is a romance based on the premise of a global rising of united peoples of colour.31 In the 1930s and even into the war, many black Americans cheered on Japanese imperialism as a non-white challenge to white supremacy.32 The roots of the characterization of black Americans’ position as an instance of ‘domestic colonialism’ in the early 1960s lay in an e ort not merely to elevate the black insurgency’s power and significance through association with Third World struggles, but also to advocate a model of national liberation as a programme and approach for black politics in the US.33 Third Worldism was in general more a rhetorical phenomenon than a substantively programmatic one. Marxist revolutionaries on the capitalist periphery embraced it as an aspiration. Mao propounded a ‘three worlds’ theory, and Cuba still maintains the Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, África, y América Latina (OSPAAL). Left governments in Venezuela and elsewhere have drawn on imagery at least evocative of Third Worldism and Non-Alignment in their e orts to organize regional and supra-regional (typically based on common export commodities) economic and political blocs. The Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), with member states in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, is arguably the most extensive and successful of those e orts. For the most part, however, the history of Third Worldism and the Non-Aligned Movement as predicated on the goal of global alliance of ‘peoples of colour’ – anti-imperialist or otherwise – has been very much oversold.34 Moreover, the view that non-whiteness provides a basis for transnational political alliance simply rehearses the mystification that colonialism had been driven fundamentally by white supremacist ideology. As Fanon observed early in the period of decolonization, that mystification, in identifying racial transfer of formal authority as the essence of national liberation, also obscured the extent to which imperialism was always first and foremost a class project, of which colonialism buttressed by racialist fables was only one historically specific form. In any event, as anti-colonial and national liberation struggles intensified in the 1960s against the backdrop of the escalating Indochina War, Western leftists, almost as a reflex, generally supported those insurgent movements and defended them against inegalitarian critics and imperialist state power; doing so was consistent with the left’s egalitarian and democratic values. Many of those movements contained different ideological and class tendencies, a complexity often obscured by their populist rhetoric, which posited claims to represent the authentic ‘people’. How class dynamics played out in national liberation movements that succeeded in winning independence and official self-determination is well known. Even several of those movements that embraced socialism and attempted to link the national liberation struggle to a popular class politics – e.g., the FLN in Algeria, the African National Congress in South Africa and those that came to power in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa – were ultimately incorporated into the logic of capitalist globalization in ways that articulated with domestic class contradictions.35 In the US, escalation of the war on Vietnam encouraged greater attentiveness in the left to imperialist interventionism, and over that decade armed national liberation or revolutionary struggles intensified in much of the former colonial world and Latin America. At the same time the Black Power nationalist embrace of the domestic colonial analogy and the discourse of national liberation gave a radical halo to what was, militant rhetorical flourishes aside, programmatically an ethnic politics fully incorporable with the pluralist interest-group system. Notwithstanding the sincere convictions of adherents, Black Power was, consistent with ethnic politics in general, very much a class-based affair, harnessing an abstract and symbolic racial populism to an agenda that centred concretely on advancing the interests and aspirations of new political and entrepreneurial strata which emerged from the victories of the civil rights movement and demographic racial transition in American cities.36 In relation to a history of racial exclusion, it was reasonable and appropriate that many leftists supported what was substantively a programme for inclusion on a racial-democratic model. And the rhetorical militancy and racial-populist symbolism associated with Black Power, including the tropes of national liberation, reinforced the sense that it was a radical or revolutionary tendency that leftists should support. For more than half a century that view of Black Power has obscured the significance of the mid-1960s debate in black politics over the movement’s direction in the wake of the legislative victories. On one side, a working- class and labour-based black radicalism, propounded principally by A. Philip Randolph and his associate and longtime civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, argued that the struggle for black equality faced new, larger challenges opened by the defeat of Jim Crow that required building a different sort of movement centred on the familiar black-liberal-labour-left alliance. In questioning whether ‘civil rights movement’ even remained an accurate description, Rustin argued, in a widely read essay published a year before Stokely Carmichael introduced the Black Power slogan to the world, that the next phase of the struggle called for expanding the movement’s vision ‘beyond race relations to economic relations’. He argued that it could not succeed ‘in the absence of radical programs for full employment, abolition of slums, the reconstruction of our educational system, new definitions of work and leisure. Adding up the cost of such programs, we can only conclude that we are talking about a refashioning of our political economy.’ For that reason, he contended: ‘The future of the Negro struggle depends on whether the contradictions of this society can be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces which becomes the effective political majority in the United States. I speak of the coalition which staged the March on Washington, passed the Civil Rights Act, and laid the basis for the Johnson landslide – Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups.’37 This was an unambiguous assertion of the social-democratic tendency in black politics, which Randolph and Rustin followed up with introduction of a ‘Freedom Budget’ that laid out an agenda for realizing a full-employment economy and its benefits for the society as a whole, noting that black Americans’ circumstances would be improved disproportionately if the Budget were implemented.38 For a variety of structural and idiosyncratic reasons, their call did not gain social traction.39 Contributing to its defeat was that the racial-democratic tendency aligned more comfortably with new institutional opportunities made available by the Voting Rights Act, racial transition in cities, anti-discrimination enforcement and the War on Poverty, all of which constituted a class-based racial redistribution that comported with the material aspirations of the emerging, post-segregation black professional-managerial class.40 Incipient Black Power racial populism obscured the class character of those developments. Particularly ironic, in light of the subsequent development of black politics, is that many radicals successfully deployed racial populism, reinforced by allusions to anti-colonial and national liberation struggles, to portray the social-democratic approach advocated by Randolph and Rustin as a conservative ‘integrationist’ call for subordination to white interests. Because black radicals never had the political capacity to challenge for state power or a broad and deep popular base, the movement’s class tensions seldom surfaced in political debate. By the mid-1960s the racial-democratic tendency’s cultural force and institutional clout – including its incorporation within postwar liberalism – had made its commitment to racial redistribution practically hegemonic as the standard of justice and equality for black Americans. In retrospect, that moment marked the birth of antiracism as a claim to a discrete politics. The ambiguity and murkiness in black popular front radicalism regarding intra-racial class dynamics undercut the ability of social-democratic advocates to mount appropriate critical responses. For the most part, such advocates also fell back on a discourse of racial authenticity and objections that the strategies and objectives of the emerging political class did not properly represent the interests of the ‘community’ or the ‘people’. The conceptual limitations imposed by that fetishized racial populism testified to and reinforced professional-managerial class hegemony in black politics. Partly from ideological pur~~blind~~ness, partly from material imperatives, the expressions of political radicalism that purported to dissent from the consolidating new black class politics – openly idealist cultural nationalism, a new, anti-imperialist Pan-Africanism, and a potted Marxism-Leninism – defined their radicalism through withdrawal from mundane political dynamics and embrace of one or another flavour of millenarian revolutionary catechism.41 Some black radicals, particularly in the 1970s moment of the largely Maoist New Communist movement in the US, strove to meld their fundamentally nationalist discourse of national liberation with a Marxist anti-imperialism. The Black Panther Party had been an early expression of this inclination.42 However, that turn retained the crucial assumptions of national liberation discourse, especially the most significant one – the nationalist premise that posits the group as an authentically communitarian and singular ‘people’ united against external oppression, and represents the character of class struggle within the population (e.g., black Americans) as that ‘people’ arrayed against inauthentic ‘misleaders’ or a co-opted, comprador element. That view originated in the ‘domestic colonialism’ analogy that emerged from some radicals’ early 1960s identification with Third World insurgencies. The great irony of this apparently radical tendency is that the communitarian populism on which it rested worked mainly to obscure class dynamics within black politics. It is a marker of retreat from programmatic commitment to social transformation that many who consider themselves on the left accept the stance that racial politics is more radical or inclusive than class politics and that pursuit of socialism is suspect on identitarian grounds. Ascriptive identity becomes the primary basis for political commitment, and solidarity on the basis of who we are trumps solidarity on the basis of what we believe only when the left no longer has a transformative vision around which to cohere as a basis for political judgment. Antiracism does not have an affirmative agenda, a fact that complements a left that by and large has little clarity of social vision itself. Antiracist politics mimes radicalism with posture and performative evocation of earlier insurgent politics like Black Power radicalism in the US and the national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but with complete erasure of the class and political-economic tensions in which those movements were immersed. CONCLUSION Positing a singular black community or racial political aspiration has had long- reaching effects on black politics, and leftist scholarship on black Americans, that have facilitated accommodation to neoliberal imperatives often while intending quite the opposite. Proliferation of a literature that presumes a singular ‘black freedom movement’, ‘black liberation movement’ or even a ‘long civil rights movement’ divests black Americans’ political activity of its tensions and structural contradictions. The effect is to de-historicize examination of black politics. Politically, this tendency has obscured thirty years or more of steadily lowered expectations for what can be gained from political action. This was exemplified clearly during the 2016 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination when in South Carolina, longtime Georgia Congressman and former civil rights movement icon John Lewis and his fellow black Congressman James Clyburn from South Carolina denounced the Sanders campaign’s proposal for free public higher education as irresponsible because it sent the bad message that people should expect free things – that is, decommodified public goods and services – from government. ‘Nothing is free in America’, Lewis snarled.43 Left-neoliberal exuberance surrounding the Democratic National Convention’s official nomination of Hillary Clinton as its presidential candidate made undeniably clear that antiracism and other identitarian expressions are more than simply compatible with neoliberalism but are most meaningfully active components of its ideological reproduction. Dara Lind, writing in vox.com, exulted that ‘a commitment to diversity has become the [Democratic] party’s unifying principle’, and Jeet Heer gushed in The New Republic that ‘the Democratic Party opened their arms to Republicans – without compromising their liberal values’.44 Identity and social liberalism in this happy vision will completely override the Democrats’ enduring class loyalties, and contradictions. There are two final ironies to note regarding the left embrace of antiracist politics. First, all politics in a class society is class politics. Antiracism is not exempt from that reality. What its proponents will not admit is that it is a class politics but not a working-class politics. Second, representing race as a primordial identity also elevates it as a social force above the dynamics of the reproduction of capitalist social relations; in that sense, antiracist politics of the contemporary sort proceeds from the same primordialist view of race as did fin-de-siècle race theorists. And that is also a case of argument by historical analogy coming home to roost.

#### The aff’s rejection of the specific details of political engagement is not radical but continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eviscerates our ability to construct alternatives to political domination

Burgum ‘15 (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, “The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism,” *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being “distracted”. In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand’s critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself.¶ For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, “a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence” (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)3 instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, “a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered … everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism.¶ Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” which he describes as a “modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain … it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice” (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically “duped” by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they “know” that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose “not to know” and don’t act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such,¶ cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. (Žižek, 1989, p. 23)¶ The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on “knowing” that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action.¶ As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it¶ can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399)¶ The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism.¶ The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge … but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146).¶ This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness.¶ It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his *New Statesman* piece that¶ the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors … this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum … for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive.¶ Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic.¶ As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose “immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.

#### Their basic frame for politics reconfirms the failures of the Left, turning debate into a Vampires’ Castle where the propagation of guilt and cycles of pseudo-activity overcome meaningful theorizing and political change

Fisher 13 (Mark Fisher, commissioning editor at Zer0 Books, programme Leader of the MA in Aural and Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, lecturer at the University of East London, “Exiting the Vampire Castle,” The North Star, November 22, 2013)

Inside the Vampires’ Castle The first configuration is what I came to call the Vampires’ Castle. The Vampires’ Castle specialises in propagating guilt. It is driven by a priest’s desire to excommunicate and condemn, an academic-pedant’s desire to be the first to be seen to spot a mistake, and a hipster’s desire to be one of the in-crowd. The danger in attacking the Vampires’ Castle is that it can look as if – and it will do everything it can to reinforce this thought – that one is also attacking the struggles against racism, sexism, heterosexism. But, far from being the only legitimate expression of such struggles, the Vampires’ Castle is best understood as a bourgeois-liberal perversion and appropriation of the energy of these movements. The Vampires’ Castle was born the moment when the struggle not to be defined by identitarian categories became the quest to have ‘identities’ recognised by a bourgeois big Other. The privilege I certainly enjoy as a white male consists in part in my not being aware of my ethnicity and my gender, and it is a sobering and revelatory experience to occasionally be made aware of these blind-spots. But, rather than seeking a world in which everyone achieves freedom from identitarian classification, the Vampires’ Castle seeks to corral people back into identi-camps, where they are forever defined in the terms set by dominant power, crippled by self-consciousness and isolated by a logic of solipsism which insists that we cannot understand one another unless we belong to the same identity group. I’ve noticed a fascinating magical inversion projection-disavowal mechanism whereby the sheer mention of class is now automatically treated as if that means one is trying to downgrade the importance of race and gender. In fact, the exact opposite is the case, as the Vampires’ Castle uses an ultimately liberal understanding of race and gender to obfuscate class. In all of the absurd and traumatic twitterstorms about privilege earlier this year it was noticeable that the discussion of class privilege was entirely absent. The task, as ever, remains the articulation of class, gender and race – but the founding move of the Vampires’ Castle is the dis-articulation of class from other categories. The problem that the Vampires’ Castle was set up to solve is this: how do you hold immense wealth and power while also appearing as a victim, marginal and oppositional? The solution was already there – in the Christian Church. So the VC has recourse to all the infernal strategies, dark pathologies and psychological torture instruments Christianity invented, and which Nietzsche described in The Genealogy of Morals. This priesthood of bad conscience, this nest of pious guilt-mongers, is exactly what Nietzsche predicted when he said that something worse than Christianity was already on the way. Now, here it is … The Vampires’ Castle feeds on the energy and anxieties and vulnerabilities of young students, but most of all it lives by converting the suffering of particular groups – the more ‘marginal’ the better – into academic capital. The most lauded figures in the Vampires’ Castle are those who have spotted a new market in suffering – those who can find a group more oppressed and subjugated than any previously exploited will find themselves promoted through the ranks very quickly. The first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything. While in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour. Some of these working class types are not terribly well brought up, and can be very rude at times. Remember: condemning individuals is always more important than paying attention to impersonal structures. The actual ruling class propagates ideologies of individualism, while tending to act as a class. (Many of what we call ‘conspiracies’ are the ruling class showing class solidarity.) The VC, as dupe-servants of the ruling class, does the opposite: it pays lip service to ‘solidarity’ and ‘collectivity’, while always acting as if the individualist categories imposed by power really hold. Because they are petit-bourgeois to the core, the members of the Vampires’ Castle are intensely competitive, but this is repressed in the passive aggressive manner typical of the bourgeoisie. What holds them together is not solidarity, but mutual fear – the fear that they will be the next one to be outed, exposed, condemned. The second law of the Vampires’ Castle is: make thought and action appear very, very difficult. There must be no lightness, and certainly no humour. Humour isn’t serious, by definition, right? Thought is hard work, for people with posh voices and furrowed brows. Where there is confidence, introduce scepticism. Say: don’t be hasty, we have to think more deeply about this. Remember: having convictions is oppressive, and might lead to gulags. The third law of the Vampires’ Castle is: propagate as much guilt as you can. The more guilt the better. People must feel bad: it is a sign that they understand the gravity of things. It’s OK to be class-privileged if you feel guilty about privilege and make others in a subordinate class position to you feel guilty too. You do some good works for the poor, too, right? The fourth law of the Vampires’ Castle is: essentialize. While fluidity of identity, pluarity and multiplicity are always claimed on behalf of the VC members – partly to cover up their own invariably wealthy, privileged or bourgeois-assimilationist background – the enemy is always to be essentialized. Since the desires animating the VC are in large part priests’ desires to excommunicate and condemn, there has to be a strong distinction between Good and Evil, with the latter essentialized. Notice the tactics. X has made a remark/ has behaved in a particular way – these remarks/ this behaviour might be construed as transphobic/ sexist etc. So far, OK. But it’s the next move which is the kicker. X then becomes defined as a transphobe/ sexist etc. Their whole identity becomes defined by one ill-judged remark or behavioural slip. Once the VC has mustered its witch-hunt, the victim (often from a working class background, and not schooled in the passive aggressive etiquette of the bourgeoisie) can reliably be goaded into losing their temper, further securing their position as pariah/ latest to be consumed in feeding frenzy. The fifth law of the Vampires’ Castle: think like a liberal (because you are one). The VC’s work of constantly stoking up reactive outrage consists of endlessly pointing out the screamingly obvious: capital behaves like capital (it’s not very nice!), repressive state apparatuses are repressive. We must protest! Neo-anarchy in the UK The second libidinal formation is neo-anarchism. By neo-anarchists I definitely do not mean anarchists or syndicalists involved in actual workplace organisation, such as the Solidarity Federation. I mean, rather, those who identify as anarchists but whose involvement in politics extends little beyond student protests and occupations, and commenting on Twitter. Like the denizens of the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchists usually come from a petit-bourgeois background, if not from somewhere even more class-privileged. They are also overwhelmingly young: in their twenties or at most their early thirties, and what informs the neo-anarchist position is a narrow historical horizon. Neo-anarchists have experienced nothing but capitalist realism. By the time the neo-anarchists had come to political consciousness – and many of them have come to political consciousness remarkably recently, given the level of bullish swagger they sometimes display – the Labour Party had become a Blairite shell, implementing neo-liberalism with a small dose of social justice on the side. But the problem with neo-anarchism is that it unthinkingly reflects this historical moment rather than offering any escape from it. It forgets, or perhaps is genuinely unaware of, the Labour Party’s role in nationalising major industries and utilities or founding the National Health Service. Neo-anarchists will assert that ‘parliamentary politics never changed anything’, or the ‘Labour Party was always useless’ while attending protests about the NHS, or retweeting complaints about the dismantling of what remains of the welfare state. There’s a strange implicit rule here: it’s OK to protest against what parliament has done, but it’s not alright to enter into parliament or the mass media to attempt to engineer change from there. Mainstream media is to be disdained, but BBC Question Time is to be watched and moaned about on Twitter. Purism shades into fatalism; better not to be in any way tainted by the corruption of the mainstream, better to uselessly ‘resist’ than to risk getting your hands dirty. It’s not surprising, then, that so many neo-anarchists come across as depressed. This depression is no doubt reinforced by the anxieties of postgraduate life, since, like the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchism has its natural home in universities, and is usually propagated by those studying for postgraduate qualifications, or those who have recently graduated from such study. What is to be done? Why have these two configurations come to the fore? The first reason is that they have been allowed to prosper by capital because they serve its interests. Capital subdued the organised working class by decomposing class consciousness, viciously subjugating trade unions while seducing ‘hard working families’ into identifying with their own narrowly defined interests instead of the interests of the wider class; but why would capital be concerned about a ‘left’ that replaces class politics with a moralising individualism, and that, far from building solidarity, spreads fear and insecurity? The second reason is what Jodi Dean has called communicative capitalism. It might have been possible to ignore the Vampires’ Castle and the neo-anarchists if it weren’t for capitalist cyberspace. The VC’s pious moralising has been a feature of a certain ‘left’ for many years – but, if one wasn’t a member of this particular church, its sermons could be avoided. Social media means that this is no longer the case, and there is little protection from the psychic pathologies propagated by these discourses. So what can we do now? First of all, it is imperative to reject identitarianism, and to recognise that there are no identities, only desires, interests and identifications. Part of the importance of the British Cultural Studies project – as revealed so powerfully and so movingly in John Akomfrah’s installation The Unfinished Conversation (currently in Tate Britain) and his film The Stuart Hall Project – was to have resisted identitarian essentialism. Instead of freezing people into chains of already-existing equivalences, the point was to treat any articulation as provisional and plastic. New articulations can always be created. No-one is essentially anything. Sadly, the right act on this insight more effectively than the left does. The bourgeois-identitarian left knows how to propagate guilt and conduct a witch hunt, but it doesn’t know how to make converts. But that, after all, is not the point. The aim is not to popularise a leftist position, or to win people over to it, but to remain in a position of elite superiority, but now with class superiority redoubled by moral superiority too. ‘How dare you talk – it’s we who speak for those who suffer!’ But the rejection of identitarianism can only be achieved by the re-assertion of class. A left that does not have class at its core can only be a liberal pressure group. Class consciousness is always double: it involves a simultaneous knowledge of the way in which class frames and shapes all experience, and a knowledge of the particular position that we occupy in the class structure. It must be remembered that the aim of our struggle is not recognition by the bourgeoisie, nor even the destruction of the bourgeoisie itself. It is the class structure – a structure that wounds everyone, even those who materially profit from it – that must be destroyed. The interests of the working class are the interests of all; the interests of the bourgeoisie are the interests of capital, which are the interests of no-one. Our struggle must be towards the construction of a new and surprising world, not the preservation of identities shaped and distorted by capital. If this seems like a forbidding and daunting task, it is. But we can start to engage in many prefigurative activities right now. Actually, such activities would go beyond pre-figuration – they could start a virtuous cycle, a self-fulfilling prophecy in which bourgeois modes of subjectivity are dismantled and a new universality starts to build itself. We need to learn, or re-learn, how to build comradeship and solidarity instead of doing capital’s work for it by condemning and abusing each other. This doesn’t mean, of course, that we must always agree – on the contrary, we must create conditions where disagreement can take place without fear of exclusion and excommunication. We need to think very strategically about how to use social media – always remembering that, despite the egalitarianism claimed for social media by capital’s libidinal engineers, that this is currently an enemy territory, dedicated to the reproduction of capital. But this doesn’t mean that we can’t occupy the terrain and start to use it for the purposes of producing class consciousness. We must break out of the ‘debate’ that communicative capitalism in which capital is endlessly cajoling us to participate in, and remember that we are involved in a class struggle. The goal is not to ‘be’ an activist, but to aid the working class to activate – and transform – itself. Outside the Vampires’ Castle, anything is possible.

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

Robinson 14(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises ¶ Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. ¶ Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. ¶ Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 ¶ This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: ¶ 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. ¶ 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* ¶ 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? ¶ 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; ¶ 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. ¶ Global Police State ¶ How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. ¶ One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. ¶ Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### The alternative is to theorize through communism, which contests the political efficacy and descriptive accuracy of the 1AC by returning to the conceptual tools long central to the American black radical tradition

Ferguson ‘15 (Stephen C., Assoc. Prof. in Liberal Studies @ North Carolina A & T State U., *Philosophy of African American Studies: Nothing Left of Blackness*, p. 7-14)

Marxism in Ebony Materialist Philosophical Inquiry and Black Studies In any academic discipline, there exist varying, oftentimes even conflicting, conceptual frameworks, theoretical approaches, and methods. Black Studies is no different. In light of the theoretical works prominent today, however, a number of students in AAS might easily conclude that philosophical idealism is the only school of thought. To the contrary, Black Leftist activists were significant players during the early period of Black Studies. The first introductory textbooks in African American Studies were written by Marxist/socialist scholars and activists; for instance, Peoples College's Introduction to Afro-American Studies and Clarence Munford's Production Relations, Class and Black Liberation: A Marxist Perspective in Afro-American Studies. Communist like Jack O'Dell and Robert Rhodes taught African American Studies courses at the Antioch College branch campus in Washington, D. C. And pioneering Black historian and "antibourgeois gadfly" Earl Thorpe - chair of the history department at North Carolina College - was recruited to teach courses on "Marxism and Black Liberation" for the Black Studies program at Duke University.23 However, today, Leftist thought is marginal to the politics and philosophy of Black Studies. Socialism and Marxism-Leninism are integral parts of African American history and culture. Of course, Marxist scholar/activists contributed to African American intellectual history and culture long before what is, in more formal terms, considered the advent of Black Studies during the late 1960s. In the tradition of Hubert Harrison, Susie Revels Cayton, Maude White Katz, Richard B. Moore, Paul Robeson, Oliver Cox, Eugene Holmes, Abram Harris, Claudia Jones, Walter Rodney, Angela Davis, and John McClendon, there is a need to bring the Black working-class-men and women-back into AAS. A materialist philosophy inquiry into Black Studies is grounded on three presuppositions. A materialist conception of epistemology and ontology presumes that there is a reality independent of our consciousness. A materialist ontology asserts the primacy of material reality over consciousness. And a materialist epistemology posits that this reality is knowable and knowledge or what is cognitive (social consciousness) corresponds to and thus ideally approximates this material reality. Lastly, a materialist philosophy presupposes that the social world is a stratified ontology of which class relations (i.e., social relations of production) form the ground for understanding social processes. The call for a materialist conception of science and epistemology should not be seen as a call for an essentialist ascription of AAS, wherein it is viewed only as a social scientific enterprise devoid of cultural studies. The current popularity of cultural studies, often in collaboration with various species of historicism and postmodernist trends, fosters a separation between cultural studies and social relations of production. As a school of thought, it gives less attention to the material conditions that give rise to African American culture and relativizes the objective character of the Black experience. In my estimation, the Black working-class has become lost in the whirlwind of cultural idealism. Contemporary Black cultural theory – under the spell of poststructuralism and Afrocentricity – has declared: class is dead! All that exists is intersectionality and a "matrix of domination," in which everyone is oppressed – women, men, capitalist, workers, children, ad infinitum. And there is a tendency in Black Studies to transform the Black workingclass into some obscure gray matter known as the consumer, the multitude, or – my favorite from the "friends of the poor" – the Black underclass.24 The relevance and importance of the Black working-class must be brought to the forefront of Black Studies.25 This would entail discarding analytical notions such as "cultural deprivation," "human capital," "culture of poverty," "nihilism," "feminization of poverty," "intersectionality," "underclass," "cultural pathology," and "menticide" that have served to explain the contemporary and historical crisis that confronts the Black working-class. We must discard the cultural idealism of Maulana Karenga, Corne! West, Jawanza Kunjufu, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, Molefi Asante, and William Julius Wilson who perceive the "Negro Question'' as an ideological or axiological crisis, for example, as alienation from ancient African values, the loss of a "love ethic," or the lack of human capital. When we view the “Negro Question” as preeminently ideological, moral, or cultural, we ultimately discount the determinate role of material contradictions rooted in class contradictions. As Robert Allen astutely noted, " ... the question is not politics or no politics; rather it is which politics? Whom will Black Studies serve? Will it be truly democratic in its intellectual and political vision, or will it become 'apolitical' and acquiesce to a narrow, elitist and bourgeois view of education?"26 Black Studies and the Question of Western Civilization Revisited C. L. R. James wrote what could be considered a Marxist manifesto for Black Studies in 1969. Speaking at Federal City College, James argues, at the level of theory, that Black Studies should be anti-racist and anti-imperialist in character, but not anti-white. From James's perspective, there is no intellectual space in Black Studies for philosophies of Blackness in which ancient African civilizations, values, and cultural perspectives constitute a "presuppositionless beginning" for Black Studies.27 He parts company with Black nationalists and their contemporary progeny (e.g., Afrocentrists) who argue that every culture rests on a metaphysical, permanent substratum that gives rise to a particular system of thought. He cogently proclaims: We need a careful systematic building up of historical, economic, political, literary ideas, knowledge and information, on the Negro question ... Because it is only where we have Bolshevik ideas, Marxist ideas, Marxist knowledge, Marxist history, Marxist perspectives, that you are certain to drive out bourgeois ideas, bourgeois history, bourgeois perspectives which are so powerful on the question of the races in the United States.28 [Italics Added] For James, the antithesis between bourgeois ideology and proletarian ideology is essential to the development, direction, and aim of Black Studies. James is often viewed as someone who was head-over-heels in love with Western culture and/or civilization. Yet, it is important to note that dialectical and historical materialism (or Marxism-Leninism) constitutes the conceptual and theoretical framework for his assessment of "The Fate of Humanity." In a 1939 article, "Revolution and the Negro" James boldly avows, "What we as Marxists have to see is the tremendous role played by Negroes in the transformation of Western civilization from feudalism to capitalism. It is only from this vantage-point that we shall be able to appreciate (and prepare for) the still greater role they must of necessity play in the transition from capitalism to socialism."29 James's classic works such as *The Black ]acobins* and *A History of Pan-African Revolt* are ardently attentive to the fact that slavery, colonialism, and imperialism are part and parcel of capitalism. Moreover, the revolutionary resistance of people of African descent ostensibly indicates the critical role of Black people as actors or subjects of history and the dialectical development of Western civilization. In unswerving disapproval of Hegel's views about Africans and their place outside of world history, James meticulously documents and effectively demonstrates that-far from being removed from world historical event-African people and their descendants in the diaspora transformed the landscape of world history in a monumental fashion.3° Yet, James's historiography is not some form of racial vindicationism, which claims that ancient African civilization is the real source of Black historic magnitude and ultimately collective identity. Rather James offers insights into the Black struggles against slavery and colonialism as manifestations of the antagonistic contradictions within the modern (bourgeois) stage of world history. Cultural idealism has no place within James's worldview and consequently his philosophy of history. James's philosophy of history is not anti-European, anti-Western, or anti-white; his philosophy of history is stridently anti-slavery, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and anticapitalist.31 James introduces a conceptual distinction between what is European and what is Eurocentrism. Moreover, he did not accept the abstract concept of the West as monolithic, devoid of internal class relations and contradictory class interests. Black sociologist Alex Dupuy points out that James's dialectical analysis takes into consideration the tremendous value of European culture and its influence on the African diaspora, and vice versa.32 Dupuy argues, "James was redefining the meaning of Western culture away from its Eurocentric understanding. For [James], West Indians were a modern and Western people, though they were not European, a point [James] made in many of his writings, e.g., his semiautobiography, Beyond a Boundary (1963)." 33 James resolutely rejected any outlook that requires Black Studies to be grounded on a uniquely formulated Black perspective (e.g., Senghor's Negritude or Karenga's Kawaida or Asante's Afrocentricity). Dupuy points out that James does not "reject African culture in favor of Western culture." 34 Rather, James's analysis is based on "a historical materialist understanding of culture" and the recognition that "the predominant influences in the Caribbean were those of Western Europe."35 As Dupuy insightfully notes, "The Black ]acobins remains ... one of the most succinct critiques of the barbarism of Western European imperialism but also of the promise of bourgeois civilization."36 Any philosophy of AAS worth its salt should follow in the "Giant Steps" of C. L. R. James. Embracing an ethnophilosophy that is anti-European is as fruitful as masturbation. It may be pleasurable, perhaps even therapeutic, but it won't give birth to a scientific approach to Black Studies. "And that Black Fist becomes a Red Spark" Black Studies and Black Working-Class Studies37 In a post-Cold War world, the "spectre of communism" has apparently been exorcised and laid to rest. There is the widespread belief that we have witnessed the death-knell of Marxism. So, why argue for the legitimacy of and necessity for Marxism in Black Studies? No doubt this has been a hotly debated question both in the Black Liberation movement and in Black Studies for a considerable time. I tend to agree with Brian Lloyd: "I presume that we are witnessing, not the death of Marxism, but the end of the first period during which Marxists managed to seize and, for a time, wield state power. That it has fewer adherents at the end than during other phases of this period, and that as many of them can be found in universities as in factories or fields, is neither disheartening as is imaged by some of its proponents nor as amusing as is supposed by all of its detractors."38 It has become the custom to summarily dismiss Marxism as a viable methodological approach and philosophical perspective for Black Studies. Most of the adversarial postures toward Marxism-Leninism in Black Studies have discounted the value of a materialist dialectical philosophy of liberation, class analysis, class struggle, proletarian internationalism, and the scientific socialist principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Despite the sharp divergence of their political views, Harold Cruse, Cedric Robinson, Cornel West, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, and Charles Mills have condemned Marx and Marxism for everything from economic determinism to class reductionism to historical teleology and any number of other "conceits." We even find Asante making such puerile statements such as the following: "In fact, we have no history of a communist movement in the United States where communists put their bodies and l.ives on the line as African Americans did."39 Contrary to Asante's claim, scholars such as Mark Naison, Ted Vincent, Erik S. McDuffie, Gerald Horne, Carole Boyce Davies, Robin Kelley, Minkah Makalani, and Mark Solomon in addition to autobiographies by Harry Haywood, Hosea Hudson, and Michael Hamlin offer a much more nuanced picture of communism, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism in Black life and culture. Over the years, scholarship in labor studies and Black Studies has revealed the historical legacy of Black worker militancy. As we travel through the annals of Black history, we unearth Peter Clark's crucial involvement in the Great Railway Strike of 1877, Lucy Parsons's unflinching engagement in the Haymarket Square struggle, the heroic efforts of Ralph Gray, Tommy Gray, Eula Gray, Al Murphy, and scores of Black sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers to organize the predominantly Black underground organization the Share Croppers Union, A. Philip Randolph's tireless efforts with rhe Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Ferdinand Smith's vanguard role in the National Maritime Union and Paul Robeson's monumental efforts to use folk music to entertain Spanish Civil War loyalists and striking workers as he gave support to international socialist solidarity. We could mention the steadfast leadership of Velma Hopkins and Moranda Smith in the 1947 strike at the Reynolds Tobacco Company in Winston Salem, North Carolina. There were Black postal workers like Cleveland Morgan, a member of New York Branch 36 of the National Association of Letter Carriers, who played a seminal role in the nationwide 1970 postal wildcat strike. We could also mention the historic efforts of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers to organize wildcat strikes in Detroit, Michigan. And, in more recent times, we could mention working-class Black women who have fought against the attack on public services, such as public housing and welfare. We should not ignore the fact that many of these activists were socialists, and quite a few were Marxist-Leninist in their ideological outlook. The scholarship of Clarence Lang, John Arena, Adolph Reed, Barbara Ransby, Rhonda Y. Williams, and Joe Trotter has demonstrated the historic importance of the Black working-class to African American history and culture. They bring to light the centrality of class struggle and conflict as determinate features of what makes up the Black working-class. World capitalism gave birth to the Black working-class. The initial accumulation of large sums of capital, which in turn, was invested in the exploitation of European workers, derived from the slave trade and the plantation system in the so-called New World. In volume one of Capital, Marx so famously wrote "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt."40 The ruthless exploitation of Black bodies, in a manner of speaking, became the proverbial goose that lays golden eggs, possessing the magical ability to increase the magnitude of capital. Incidentally, the profitability of the "proverbial goose" prompted slaveholder Thomas Jefferson to remark, "it would never do to destroy the goose."41 Leaving the decks of the slave ship, "In the Name of Jesus," large numbers of Wolof, Mande, Fulani, and Mandingo were bound together by chains, from neck to neck and wrist to wrist.42 Out of the diversity of African ethnic groups a new synthesis was formed under the brutal system of capitalist slavery, giving birth to African Americans. The incessant "demand for Black labor" by Northern industrial capital and the plantation bourgeoisie fueled world capitalist development. Black slaves toiled in textile mills, shipyards, sawmills, and coalmines from Virginia to Mississippi. Black women labored on tobacco fields in the Carolina piedmont and picked cotton on plantations along the coast of Georgia. Black men like Tom Molineaux and Black women like Sylvia DuBois were given release time from slave labor in order to engage in athletic labor (as boxers) to bring entertainment and profits to slaveholders and the larger white Southern community. 43 From the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century, from slave plantations to auto factories, Black women, men, and children labored under the hard times of capitalist exploitation. The brutal forces unleashed by the capitalist drive for surplus value laid the foundation for the development of African American life and culture, from religion to music.44 Presently, we are witnessing, from New York to North Carolina to Missouri to Wisconsin to California, concerted attacks on public sector workers in order to resolve the economic crisis ravaging US capitalism. We cannot ignore the fact that Black people are prominent in the leadership as well as in the rank and file in a great number of these mass demonstrations. In cities throughout the country, working-class men and women, Black, white, and Latino, are being blown away by police officers who are ultimately protected by the rule of law. In the aftermath of the murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Aiyanna Jones, Yvette Smith, Rekia Boyd, and Eric Garner, Black working people are not silently standing by while the "Lords of Capital" via their "special bodies of armed men'' – with military weapons and tanks – confront them in the streets. This seminal point is lost on Black critics of Marxism during the past 90 years. As numerous studies in AAS have demonstrated, the working-class is not one-dimensional, exclusively composed of white people. The working-class is composed of women, men, and children, in addition to being multinational in character. Marxist studies of Black working-class life and culture are needed now more than ever because in the souls of the Black working-class the grapes of wrarh are filling and growing heavy. As Karl Marx so famously put it, "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses."45 Philosophy of African American Studies, I hope, wilt serve a prolegomena to the Herculean task of developing a philosophy of AAS from the standpoint of materialism. How well I have backed up this reaffirmation of philosophical materialism and revolutionary socialism with good arguments I leave it to my readers to judge. But the attempt to do so provides an answer-satisfactory to me at least-to justify writing this book.

## Case

### Health Care

#### Robust anti-discrimination laws combined with universal access can reduce medical malpractice and racial discrimination

Matthew 15 – Dayna Bowen Matthew, William L. Matheson and Robert M. Morgenthau Distinguished Professor of Law at UVA School of Law, F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, previously served on the University of Colorado law faculty as a professor, vice dean and associate dean of academic affairs, J.D. from the University of Virginia (*Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care*, “A Structural Solution,” New York University Press, pages 183-193)

Long-Lasting Protective Interventions: Universal Coverage Reforms at the third tier of the health impact pyramid represent long-lasting protective interventions. These are large-scale, often one-time changes that may address some structural issues, but do so by reaching people as individuals rather than changing their collective economic or medical contexts. The third tier interventions are the societal changes that are likely to have some impact on improving health disparities; however, these reforms are also unlikely to fundamentally transform the history and culture of racial and ethnic discrimination in health care. The American effort to achieve universal health insurance coverage is one such example. U.S. presidents throughout America’s political history have futilely engaged in the rhetoric of health equality and justice for over a century. In 1912—ironically, the year the British Parliament passed that country’s National Insurance Act—President Teddy Roosevelt introduced “social insurance” in an effort to provide universal medical coverage “against the hazards of sickness” as part of the Progressive Bull Moose platform, which declared, “The supreme duty of the Nation is the conservation of human resources through an enlightened measure of social and industrial justice.”31 In 1945, President Harry Truman delivered a special message to Congress recommending a comprehensive national health program as part of an Economic Bill of Rights that ensured “the right to adequate medical care . . . the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health . . . [and] the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of sickness.”32 When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Social Security Act of 1965 into law, establishing the Medicare and Medicaid health insurance programs, his words described a reform aimed at eliminating “the injustice that denies the miracle of healing to the old and to the poor.”33 President Richard Nixon, speaking to Congress in 1974 to introduce his Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan, began by declaring that “one of the most cherished goals of our democracy is to assure every American an equal opportunity to lead a full and productive life”34 as he implored the legislature to expand Medicare, Medicaid, and mandatory employer-based insurance coverage. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter proposed a “National Health Plan,” citing the challenge to “secure for all Americans access to quality health care as a matter of right.”35 A decade later, President Bill Clinton introduced the Health Security Act of 1993 in a bid to achieve universal coverage through managed competition.36 Most recently, upon passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act which enacts insurance reforms intended to expand health coverage to 25 million previously uninsured Americans, President Barack Obama declared, “Tonight’s vote is not a victory for any one party—it’s a victory . . . for the American people.” The president’s remarks reinforced the equality objectives that underlie this act, calling the new reform a “system that works better for the American people.”37 The American political effort to achieve health justice through universal access has spanned decades and crossed the political spectrum. Nevertheless, our nation’s focus has been on achieving equal access to health care, not on achieving equal health care quality for all Americans. The political goal has been to expand access to health insurance so that a larger number of Americans can purchase health care. While achieving equitable access to health care encounters is essential, true equality in health care demands more. Equal access to health care will not change the disparate health outcomes that minority patients suffer as long as the quality of the care to which they are afforded access remains substantively inequitable. Political leaders have given little attention to the injustices that will persist even if we succeed in universalizing access to medical insurance. These include the systemic inequities that affect minority health, such as poor housing, employment, education, and food security, as well as inferior medical treatment. Interventions to correct inequities in these social determinants of health are at the bottom-most tier of Frieden’s health impact pyramid. The effort to universalize access to health insurance, in contrast, represents a protective intervention situated in the center of the health impact pyramid. Universal health insurance importantly will reach individuals needing access to health care services, but it will not change the collective attitudes that permeate the health care services they access. In point of fact, the theory of distributive justice that motivates efforts to enact universal coverage actually supports a much broader view of the nature and the moral importance of health and health care equity than our legislative efforts have addressed. Recognizing that it is beyond the capacity of any health care system to guarantee all its citizens will get all the health care that they want, or even all that they need, ethicists have explored the principles that must guide any society’s difficult decisions concerning the fair distribution of scarce yet life-saving medical resources. Health justice advocates recognize there is a difference between the obligation to guarantee just and equal access to health care and the impossible goal of guaranteeing just and equal access to health itself. Some differences in health care and health outcomes are inevitable and are neither the evidence for nor the result of injustice. Norman Daniels provides one of the most widely accepted descriptions of the nature of true health justice. He argues that just access to health and health care needs is especially important because it allows each individual member of society equal enjoyment of the normal range of all other opportunities the society has to offer. Daniels goes further to identify the level of responsibility for ensuring just health care: I shall urge a normative claim: we ought to subsume health care under a principle of justice guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity. . . . If an acceptable theory of justice includes a principle providing for fair equality of opportunity, then health-care institutions should be among those governed by it.38 Importantly, Daniels’s concept of health justice does not focus or operate exclusively on the individual level, but instead also incorporates institutional accountability. Even though Daniels’s is a theory of distributional justice—arguing that society must fairly allocate health care in order to equip all members of society to participate in the normal range of life’s opportunities—his theory requires systemic, institutional level changes in order for justice to be achieved. Daniels admits to the need for exogenous governance to achieve health justice. In short, distributional fairness alone will not eliminate racial and ethnic health disparities. Establishing a just health care system will require rooting out implicit biases that affect patients differentially. The goal must be to achieve substantive as well as distributive justice in American health care. Neither expanded MCAT testing, nor additional research, nor complex clinical regulations, nor principled professional standards, nor political efforts to expand health care access has proved effective to reduce, much less eliminate, racial and ethnic health care disparities. These reforms address disparities through interventions at the top three tiers of the health impact pyramid. Although the fundamental reforms in socioeconomic factors are beyond the scope of this book, the need to change the context in which health care is delivered—the fourth tier of the health impact pyramid—is well within reach and acutely indicated by the data and narratives collected in this book. The physician and patient narratives assembled here qualitatively describe the injustice and daily damage visited upon minority patients by health care disparities. Furthermore, the enormity of these inequities can also be quantified. One source has estimated that over 30 percent of the direct medical costs that African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans incur are excess costs due to health inequities—nearly $230 billion over a three-year period between 2003 and 2006.39 In 2005, Dr. David Satcher estimated that 83,570 deaths occur each year as a result of racial and ethnic health disparities.40 In other words, inferior, racially biased health care kills people of color and costs them lots of money while doing so! Improvements in the overall quality of medical care in the United States have narrowed persistent gaps in some key disparities indicators.41 Yet, our nation is making disturbingly little progress finding an effective solution to the structural nature of these injustices. Evidence of a Structural Problem Despite the serious responses to a serious disparities problem, in 2012, for the tenth year in a row, the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) released evidence that the fight against health disparities is stalled. AHRQ’s annual report on National Healthcare Quality and Disparities gives data that describes the progress American health care has made in reducing health care disparities. The 2012 report records changes in disparities over the period from 2002 to 2010 by racial and ethnic groups, basing these changes on measures of quality such as the number of deaths due to cancer and heart attacks and the incidence of end-stage renal disease due to diabetes. The AHRQ also reports changes in disparities in access to health care for the period from 2002 to 2009. Figure 8.2 depicts the lack of progress. The graph on the left shows the number of quality measures that represent a gap between health care delivered to minority and white Americans and how those measures are changing. The graph on the right shows the number and extent to which measures of disparaty have improved. Both graphs also show changes in the gap between high- and low-income groups for the quality and access measures. The disquieting message presented is that the overwhelming majority of disparities by race and ethnicity are static. In spite of focused attention from law- and policymakers, health care providers, and scholars, figure 8.2 paints a dispiriting picture of how far we have not come. According to figure 8.2, well over 80 percent of the measures that describe quality and access disparities for health care have remained unchanged or have grown worse over the report period. Disparate health care quality measures have improved in absolute terms between 2002 and 2010. However, the gap between quality improvements for whites and people of color has been relatively constant. A few disparities in quality of care are getting smaller. The disparity quality measures that are improving generally have to do with acute hospital care. However, the rates at which minority and white adult surgery patients receive preventative care are not improving. Some examples of widening gaps between whites and minority patient quality outcomes include the number of maternal deaths in childbirth, the number of infants who receive vaccines, the number of diabetic adults who get their glucose levels tested annually, the incidence of breast cancer diagnosed at advanced versus early stages, the number of adults over age fifty who receive preventative care in the form of colonoscopy or other diagnostic procedures, and the number of children for whom a health provider gave advice about using car safety seats. Perhaps there is some comfort in the fact that a greater number of measured disparities are improving than are worsening. Still the short and troubling story is that most disparities in the quality of health care delivered to whites as compared to patients of minority racial and ethnic groups are not changing at all. Sadly, the data shows that even less progress is being made equalizing disparities related to access to care. The access gap between Asians and whites grew smaller for four of the nineteen categories measured, improving disparities for that group by 21 percent. But over the period between 2002 and 2009, virtually none of the disparities between other minority populations and white Americans have improved. I submit that the only reforms that will significantly and effectively narrow the health disparities that AHRQ has reported over the last decade must fit into the bottom tiers of Frieden’s health action pyramid. I propose a fourth tier intervention that will change the health delivery context to make individual physicians’ default decisions healthier. My proposal aims to change the social norm surrounding unconscious racism and to affect the context in which health decisions are made, following the tradition of public health successes. For example, when a municipality fluoridates its water supply or implements clean air regulations, individuals in the community can benefit without having to exercise their individual agency to choose a health-enhancing option. I propose changing the context in which health care delivery occurs by reforming antidiscrimination law. Legal reforms will impact social norms and will incentivize long-lasting protective interventions by institutional health care providers. Institutions will create a climate for change because they will be corporately incentivized to articulate nondiscriminatory goals clearly and adopt compliance policies, procedures, and infrastructure to implement nondiscriminatory training, assessment, and enforcement. The solution I propose is designed to maximize the population-wide impact of reducing implicit biases, while also requiring individual effort to address the cognitive formation of these biases and the discriminatory conduct that they inspire. The Courage to Make Unconscious Racism Illegal Let us return to the theme raised in chapter 1: Bad laws allow discrimination to flourish, harming the health and shortening the lives of racial and ethnic minorities. Good laws can reduce discrimination in health care and ultimately change the social climate in the way that civil rights laws eventually made explicit prejudice intolerable. Throughout this book we have seen the tenacity of health disparities and the serious injuries they cause. The Biased Care Model identified six mechanisms through which implicit biases operate to produce health disparities. The literature on malleability defined the types of interventions that can alter the cognitive processes that form implicit biases and translate them into harmful discriminatory conduct. However, we have yet to see how these interventions can be generalized to affect broad contextual changes in the health care industry. We have yet to see how this information can be brought to bear to reduce health disparities. I propose that making discrimination due to unconscious racism illegal—forbidden by explicit and enforceable law—will change the context, incentives, and outcomes in health care, and will thereby reduce health disparities. A legal prohibition against the unconscious racism that causes health and health care disparities would accomplish a paradigmatic and structural change in the way American health care is delivered in three ways. An anti-implicit bias discrimination law would first signal a societal commitment to equality and justice in health care. This would be a paradigm shift, redefining the social norm around health disparities generally, but more specifically removing the ambivalence concerning the culpability of health disparities caused by unconscious racism. Laws effectively influence social norms by reflecting underlying social values that exist but about which there is incomplete information or uncertainty. Law serves to reflect commonly endorsed beliefs so that a community or society can live in accordance with collectively shared values. In health care, a law against unconscious racial discrimination would reflect the community consensus that we have seen among physicians who explicitly prefer equality and fairness in health care, but are surprised by the presence and influence of their unconscious biases. Moreover, an anti- implicit bias law in health care would extend the general disapprobation that Americans feel toward overt racial prejudice, bigotry, and discrimination. Conversely, an antidiscrimination law that accounts for implicit bias would endorse the generally shared value that favors equal rights and opportunity for all people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. However, legal expression of these values is particularly important and necessary in health care where the discrimination arises from the unconscious biases that are not well understood by most. In the health care context, this uncertainty arises in large part from the limited understanding that physicians and health care providers have about the connection between their implicit biases and the inequitable health outcomes that minorities suffer. As seen in the experiment by Dr. Alexander Green, physicians who are “clued into” the impact their implicit biases have on their medical decision-making want to change. Certainly anyone who reads this book or undertakes to systematically review the empirical social science literature about implicit bias in health care will have the information needed to understand the connection between unconscious racism and the inferior health care that minorities experience. However, only legal intervention will serve to generalize this information and signal to health providers and all others that the connection exists but will not be allowed to persist. A legal intervention prohibiting unconscious racism would serve the same purpose that legal bans and restrictions on smoking have served. To the extent that there was uncertainty or incomplete information about the health harms caused by second-hand smoke, legislative enactments sent a strong message that the dangers had been sufficiently proven to require legislative action to protect against a serious public health threat. Enacting prohibitory laws served as a collective signal to increase certainty.42 The same collective signal is needed to establish a new contextual understanding of the devastating health harms caused by unconscious racism. Secondly, an express, enforceable legal prohibition against unconscious racism in he

alth care will incentivize behavior changes by health care providers who are in the best position to eliminate the effects of unconscious bias. Such a law would empower providers as a group to address discrimination from a position that economists describe as the “cheapest cost avoiders.”43 Providers occupy this position because they are best suited to bring about the changes in health care delivery that are required to minimize the harms being caused to patients. This is the essential role of a “cheapest cost avoider.” Physicians seeking to conform to shared egalitarian values in order to enhance their personal standing and reputations, and institutional providers seeking to avoid secondorder sanctions such as shaming or ostracizing by critics of discriminatory medical systems, are in a position to reform medical education curricula, change physician credentialing requirements, mandate stereotype negation training, meaningfully diversify all ranks of the health care workforce, and take other steps to structurally address unconscious bias in health care. Again, the case of legislative bans on smoking is instructive. These laws gave permission to nonsmokers to insist that smokers remove themselves or their cigarettes to conform their behavior to laws that government actors were nowhere in sight to enforce. Smokers themselves largely comply with designated smoking areas to avoid the hassle of personal chastisement. Similarly, empirical evidence presented in chapter 7 showed that a legal prohibition could operate as a Type C intervention to change the consensus signals that cause even overtly prejudiced individuals to check their discriminatory behavior. A law prohibiting unconscious racism in health care would also incentivize Type A training and Type B diversification interventions by raising the cost of remaining indifferent to the effects that unconscious racism has on minority health outcomes.44 The goal of an antidiscrimination law directed at implicit biases would be to make discrimination due to unconscious racism so costly that a would-be discriminator would take steps to avoid the financial and reputational impact of being negatively perceived by his peers or penalized by the state. In short, legally prohibiting unconscious racism will make ignoring the prevalence of this form of discrimination an irrational choice. Finally, an antidiscrimination law that expressly incorporates discrimination due to unconscious racism would provide a direct or first-order sanction by which the state could impose fines and penalties sufficient to disrupt the self-fulfilling prophecy of negative racial and ethnic stereotypes. For those whose preferences or tastes for unconscious discrimination remained unaltered by a legally communicated social norm against such attitudes and behavior, the law would interrupt the cycle of discrimination based on an erroneously perceived justification. According to the Biased Care Model, providers’ negative perceptions of minority patients as noncompliant, uneducated, and uncooperative lead to inferior communication, minority patient dissatisfaction, statistical discrimination, and ultimately inequitable treatment decisions. All these mechanisms produce disparate health outcomes. Some advocates then use these disparate outcomes as license to argue biological, behavioral, and even genetic inferiorities that justify the discrimination and biased perceptions that feed into beginning the discriminatory cycle again. Law could interrupt this cycle of discriminatory behavior and outcomes, thereby reducing the social and moral costs that health care disparities impose on the provider, the patient, and society at large.45 There is no better time than now to abandon the failed educational, political, administrative, and self-regulatory approaches that have left health care disparities essentially unchanged for as long as they have been measured. There is no graver legal problem than saving the lives of tens of thousands of minority patients from the inequity of disparate outcomes in disease and death. We have seen that law can both harm and help the cause of health care equality. Although law has helped bring about some of the greatest successes in achieving equality, as in the case of desegregation during the civil rights era, the fact that it has done so does not argue convincingly for resorting to the same institution that also consigned blacks to segregated housing squalor, exposed Asians to dangerous vaccines, and facilitated the introduction of infectious diseases that wiped out entire populations of Native Americans in order to eradicate health discrimination today. But my argument here begins and ends with the conviction that only a radical and fundamental transformation of the context in which biased health care is currently practiced will undermine the Biased Care Model that dominates modern American health care, and only a well-conceived and enforced body of law can accomplish such a paradigm shift.

#### single-payer is a necessary part of establishing health system justice – universal health care diminishes widespread race and income-based disparities. Anti-blackness doesn’t overdetermine health outcomes.

Adam Gaffney 16, MD from New York University, 3/7/2016, Is the Path to Racial Health Equity Paved with “Reparations”? The Politics of Health, Part II, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/is-the-path-to-racial-health-equity-paved-with-reparations-the-politics-of-health-part-ii/#!

At the same time, the government’s persistent failure to create a public health care system played a foundational role in structuring American health care inequalities, both by class and race. Despite high hopes that the New Deal might realize such a system, Franklin Roosevelt failed to make health reform a priority (among other issues, he wasn’t enthusiastic about the prospects of confronting the rather reactionary doctors’ lobby).[5] At the end of World War II, a major campaign for national health insurance did emerge, backed by both Harry S. Truman and — critically — organized labor.[6] “Our new economic bill of rights,” Truman proclaimed to Congress in 1945, “should mean health security for all, regardless of residence, station, or race – everywhere in the United States.”[7] Yet this bold vision was soon smothered, the victim of a toxic redbaiting campaign pursued by the American Medical Association (AMA).[8] All that survived of it, at least in the short term, was the Hill-Burton Act, a law that funded a massive campaign of hospital-building throughout the nation. But Hill-Burton was permeated with racism from its birth. While in theory it forbid discrimination by race, the law nonetheless made an allowance for “separate but equal” facilities.[9] The implications were clear: explicit medical segregation had received the imprimatur of the law, together with generous public subsidization.¶ Only through the combined force of the civil rights movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a number of key legal challenges, and the passage of Medicare in 1965 could the rollback of American apartheid medicine begin, as will be discussed in more detail below. For now, it’s worth noting that the impact of the civil rights movement on black health was not insignificant, as demonstrated in a revealing 2013 study by epidemiologist Nancy Krieger and colleagues. In the early 1960s, these investigators found that black infant death rates were significantly higher in “Jim Crow” states (the 21 states, plus the District of Columbia, with racial discrimination on the law books) than in non-Jim Crow states. This is hardly surprising. Yet, during the late 1960s, the death rate of the former group did improve, and by the 1970s the difference had evaporated. This can be touted as evidence that political change can yield real improvements in health over time. But two additional facts complicate this interpretation. First, after 2000, the gap again opened up, albeit to a lesser extent. And, second, regardless of the impact of the Civil Rights movement on disparities among blacks, throughout this period black infant death rates were still twice that of whites.[10]¶ Meanwhile, in terms of life expectancy, recent years have seen the reduction — but not the elimination — of black-white inequalities. As the Centers for Disease Control reported last November, the difference in life expectancy between the two groups fell from 5.9 years (in 1999) to 3.6 years (in 2013). However, even this may not be entirely goods news. A widely covered study published last fall found a unique and disturbing rise in mortality among middle-aged whites (of lower socioeconomic status) between 1999 and 2013, leading the investigators to conclude that falling white-black mortality disparities in this age group “was largely driven by increased white mortality.”[11]¶ Moreover, during this same period and on into the present, a series of events have functioned as starkly visible and undeniable examples of ongoing structural health racism. Following the death last year of Freddie Gray while in policy custody, many made note of the enormous chasm in health and mortality between black neighborhoods like his and adjacent wealthier and whiter ones. Other commentators have highlighted “environmental racism,” or inequities in exposure to environmental hazards by race, emblematic of embedded structural inequality. Revealing reporting by the Washington Post, for instance, described Gray’s history of childhood lead poisoning, an exposure that is in part racially patterned. More recently, mass poisoning by lead in Flint, Michigan — the disastrous consequence of dimwitted austerity and structural marginalization — has provided yet more evidence of the downstream health consequences of political exclusion.¶ Inequalities in criminal justice itself — specifically mass incarceration and police violence — are now being explicitly contextualized within a framework of health.[12] In protest of such inequalities (made starkly visible by the killings of men like Eric Garner and the ensuing “Black Lives Matter” protests), medical students throughout the country have begun to advocate for change — for instance, with a solidarity “die-in” action on December 10, 2014, which in turn led to the formation of a new racial health justice organization (“White Coats for Black Lives”) on Martin Luther King Day in 2015.[13]¶ Finally, two new books are tackling head-on the problem of racial health inequality, albeit from very different “expert” perspectives — one from within medicine and the other from a legal perspective. Damon Tweedy’s Black Man in a White Coat, released last year, is a thoughtful memoir that explores the nexus of race and medicine through the eyes of a black physician. Law professor Dayna Bowen Matthew’s Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care, on the other hand, is an integration of legal analysis and social science that culminates in an overarching policy recommendation.¶ In what follows, I’ll first examine the issue of racism within the medical profession, turning to Tweedy’s experiences and reflections as described in his book. Next, I’ll focus on Matthew’s book, and examine the problem of explicit and implicit medical discrimination historically and in the present — and how civil rights law might be used to combat it. From there, I’ll discuss the place of the health system in the perpetuation of inequalities, and the largely neglected role that health care universalism plays in “health equality.”¶ Lastly — but most importantly — I’ll explore how health inequities by race and by class intersect. To phrase the question plainly: Does confronting the problem of racial health inequality mean that we must embrace the cause of economic redistribution, as discussed in the first part of this essay? If so, should this economic redistribution proceed within the context of social democracy (or democratic socialism?), or should it — must it — proceed along explicitly racial lines? Is the path to racial health equity paved with “reparations”?¶ ¶ 2. Black doctors: Discrimination within the profession¶ The plotline of Steven Soderbergh’s unnerving and beautifully shot series The Knick tackles racism within the medical profession by making it viscerally visible in another era. Set in a downtown Manhattan hospital at the turn of the 19th century, the black, eminently qualified physician, Algernon Edwards (Andrew Holland), is treated with derision and disdain by many of the hospital’s white staff and administrators. At the same time, the hospital turns away black patients from its outpatient clinic; Edwards surreptitiously begins treating them — under rather suboptimal operative conditions — in the hospital’s basement.[14]¶ But what about after the time period depicted in this series? Into the mid-20th century, blacks were excluded from many medical schools, and those who graduated faced intense discrimination in the course of practice. For instance, even decades after the events depicted in the Knick, black physicians were unable to provide care for their hospitalized patients in the South. This was because physicians needed to gain entry into county medical societies as a prerequisite to hospital-admitting privileges; and, in the South, these societies entirely or almost entirely denied blacks membership. The AMA virtuously professed that it opposed discrimination, and yet excused itself from doing anything, claiming it was impotent to compel integration. It took decades of political pressure to force change. In 1968, the Medical Committee for Human Rights, a health-oriented civil rights group, took matters into its own hands, invading the AMA’s convention at the extravagant Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. Such actions — in conjunction with the Civil Rights Act and the passage of Medicare — ultimately contributed to the AMA’s vote later that year to expel county societies that excluded black members, at long last forcing their disgracefully delayed integration.[15]¶ This is, of course, not to say that blacks subsequently gained equal footing within the medical profession. Black representation in US medical schools has remained proportionally low over the decades, especially for men. Indeed, a report from the Association of American Medical Colleges last year showed that the number of black male matriculants in medical school is lower now — in absolute terms — than it was in the late 1970s. Tweedy, now an assistant professor of psychiatry at Duke University Medical Center, was one of these matriculants. In his book, he describes some of the challenges he faced.¶ In addition to being one of only “a handful of black students” in his class at Duke Medical School, Tweedy came from a working class family, in stark contrast to the majority of his classmates. On the one hand, Tweedy highlights the importance of affirmative action: “So there it was: Not only was I admitted to Duke, when in a color-blind world I might not have been, but I had arrived with a full-tuition scholarship in hand.” On the other hand, his first exchange as a first year student with a medical school professor was markedly inauspicious: the professor approached him to ask if he was there to fix the lights. While he was a medical student, patients routinely queried him about his presumed basketball skills. Far worse was his interaction as a resident with a racist patient and his confederate-flag adorned family (“I don’t want no nigger doctor,” the patient told a nurse). Tweedy’s diligence and persistence ultimately, however, won them over. On another occasion, a black patient rejected him, presuming his medical skills to be inferior and seeing the assignment as evidence of racist mistreatment of him as a patient. Given the insecurities that afflict medical students and trainees in general, we can only imagine the additional strain created by such presumptions and prejudices.¶ Tweedy’s book is also very much about the experience of black patients. He bears witness to the second-class care they too frequently experience when, for instance, as a medical student he spends time in a makeshift rural clinic, “nestled within a group of dingy trailers and makeshift houses.” The clinic serves poor black patients who cannot afford prescribed treatments. They are likely to see a different doctor at every visit and receive grossly insufficient preventive care. In another chapter, he describes how one black patient, who quite reasonably declines one of his team’s medical recommendations, is dispatched with a punitive psychiatric diagnosis.¶ Toward the conclusion of his book, Tweedy briefly explores the larger and looming question: what is the cause of racial health inequalities? Early in his medical career, he had assumed — like many others — that genetic differences were the primary factor. And indeed, for years, a huge amount of resources have gone into uncovering the genetic sources of health disparities. However, as Jason Silverstein explains in a revealing article in The Atlantic (“Genes Don’t Cause Racial-Health Disparities, Society Does”), this money may have been better spent elsewhere. He describes a 2015 paper that systematically reviewed the collective evidence thus far for the proposition that genetic factors explain racial cardiovascular disparities. It’s worth quoting from the study’s conclusion:¶ The results reveal a striking absence of evidence to support the assertion that any important component of observed disparities in these diseases arises from main-effect genetic mechanisms as we currently understand them … Despite the enormous social investment in genomic studies, this research program has not yet provided valuable population-relevant insights into disparities in the most common cause of morbidity and mortality.[16]¶ Why then, Silverstein asks the study’s lead author, do genomics still get so much attention? The author responds with a sentiment I’ve long suspected: if inequalities are built into the very base pairs of our genetic code, what can we really do to alleviate them? More research? In effect, as the investigator tells Silverstein, the fact is that racism and inequities are let off the hook if our genes are the culprits. Tweedy notes that he came to reject this genetic explanation: even if genetic factors play some role with respect to specific diseases, they explain little of the overall differences in health between races.¶ In contrast, there are reams of evidence that point to social and economic inequalities as drivers of racial inequalities. In the first part of this essay, I focused on the impact of economic injustices on health: a large body of literature has demonstrated that poverty, for instance, is associated with a panoply of poor health outcomes, and some researchers argue that inequality itself causes worse health for everyone in society (perhaps via increased psychosocial strain as well as other factors).[17] No doubt such socioeconomic factors are a major factor in racial health inequalities, given the tight association between economic status and race.[18] Similarly, differences in health care access associated with race (like being uninsured) are no doubt factors as well.¶ But what might be said about the role of racially discriminatory treatment itself? This issue has received increased attention since the 2002 publication of an Institute of Medicine evidence report, Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial Disparities in Health Care. Tweedy quotes from the report’s conclusion: “Although myriad sources contribute to [health] disparities, some evidence suggests that bias, prejudice, and stereotyping on the part of the healthcare providers may contribute to differences in care.” Or, as he puts it, the “doctor-patient relationship itself serves as a catalyst for differing outcomes,” which is in part the result of the fact that “some doctors are prone to hold negative views about the ability of black patients to manage their health and therefore might recommend different, and possibly substandard, treatments to them.”¶ This issue — namely, the problem of racially disparate treatment — is the central focus of Dayna Bowen Matthew’s book. She explores how “implicit bias,” as she terms it, deforms physician behavior; in her view, it constitutes the most neglected determinant of inferior health among blacks.¶ ¶ 3. Jim Crow medicine: Past and present¶ Matthew is a law professor with appointments at both the University of Colorado Law School and the Colorado School of Public Health. Matthew is also one of the founders of the Colorado Health Equity Project, a multidisciplinary organization that works to “remove legal barriers to equal health access and health outcomes for Colorado’s vulnerable populations,” as its website puts it. Her ambitious book lays out a case for a legal remedy for racial health inequality.¶ Key to her argument is the historical context of civil rights law, which she sees as a swinging pendulum. Hill-Burton, as we’ve seen, legally enshrined the “separate-but-equal” standard — established in the Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson — within the health care system. Legal challenges to this standard were unsuccessful, until Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the “watershed case,” as Matthew puts it, initiated its unraveling. As she recounts it, the case was brought by black practitioners and patients against a discriminatory hospital in North Carolina that received Hill-Burton funds. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring, as quoted by Matthew, that “Racial discrimination by hospitals visits severe consequences upon Negro physicians and their patients.”¶ She describes two consequences that flowed from this decision. First, the case helped catalyze subsequent successful health-care related civil rights litigation throughout the country. Second, the decision — which the Supreme Court importantly declined to reconsider — helped lead the way to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to Matthew, Congress took the Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the case as a signal that it saw hospital segregation as unconstitutional (and, indeed, several legislators explicitly cited the Simkins decision during debate over the bill). Much good came from this: “From 1963 through the early 1990s,” Matthew writes, “Title VI proved an effective weapon against the segregation and discrimination that minority patients and physicians had experienced in American health care since the colonial era.” For instance, the Johnson administration required hospitals to comply with Title VI in order to be eligible for Medicare payment. Few could afford not to, and so the age of explicit hospital segregation finally came to a close.¶ Yet Matthew asserts that, to an extent, this more auspicious era ended abruptly in 2001, when a more conservative Supreme Court ruled in Alexander v. Sandoval, in a decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, that Title VI was applicable only in cases of deliberate discrimination; disparate impact was not enough.[19] This new standard precluded a great deal of civil rights litigation because it required that plaintiffs produce tangible evidence that racist health care was intentional, which is made difficult when, as she notes, “few Americans are careless enough to create an evidentiary record of outright bigotry.” Thus, according to Matthew, with respect to health care discrimination, this decision effectively rendered Title VI “a dead letter.” This decision, she argues, must be undone if progress against racial health inequalities is to proceed. In short, unconscious racism in health care must, according to her, be made illegal through an act of Congress and an expansion of Title VI.¶ This may sound Orwellian to some. Is it meaningful, after all, to talk about outlawing sentiments or attitudes that lie deep within the dark depths of our unconscious? Can we root out biases if we are, by definition, unaware of their very existence? Matthew marshals a body of literature from various disciplines to answer in the affirmative. Conscious racism, she argues, is slowly being replaced by the unconscious variety: “But while overt racism is subject to nearly universal derision, unconscious racism due to implicit bias is hidden, is tolerated, and even excused despite its destructiveness.” She persuasively explores various literatures demonstrating that physicians harbor unconscious negative perceptions of blacks. She cites studies that show that patient race affects which treatments doctors recommend, how much time they spend with patients, “the level of verbal exchange and shared decision-making in which they engage” with patients, and even the manner of their nonverbal engagement. She concludes that there is a sufficient base of evidence to conclude that these implicit biases contribute to disparities, that there is reason to believe that such biases, even though they are implicit, are remediable, and that health care providers — both on the individual and institutional level — can therefore be held legally responsible for the results of their implicit biases.¶ The “evidence of malleability” is strong, according to Matthew. In other words, she thinks specific interventions can mitigate implicit biases and, as a result, disparate outcomes. The sorts of interventions she envisions, however, seem of mixed applicability and utility. Nonetheless, overall, she makes a strong case that clinicians make racially biased decisions, whether or not they intend to, and that this issue must be directly addressed. People like me — that is to say, white physicians who believe they are immune from racially biased thought and action — have a great deal to gain from reading this book.¶ That said, it is also important to examine the larger picture. There is no question that more needs to be done to address physician bias. Yet we also have to keep in mind that, in the pre-Alexander v. Sandoval era (when Title VI was, according to Matthew, more robust), there were still large racial inequalities. Litigation may be a useful tool, but it’s a limited, post-facto modality.¶ More broadly, the recommendations of both Tweedy and Matthew ultimately seem inadequate. Neither gives much credence to the notion that further increasing the universalism of the health system might play an important role in reducing inequalities. Moreover, Tweedy says nothing, and Matthew only a little,[20] about the notion of economic redistribution as a tool against racial health inequalities. In fairness, these concerns are not the focus of their books. However, to my mind, they are crucial considerations in the larger discussion of racial health care justice.¶ ¶ 4. Health equity and health system universalism¶ Martin Luther Kings Jr.’s statement on the evils of health inequality is frequently quoted, but not usually in its full form. In his 1966 speech at the annual meeting of the aforementioned Medical Committee for Human Rights, he said, “Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most shocking and the most inhuman because it often results in physical death.”[21] Indeed, studies have shown a statistical association between lack of insurance and mortality. Removing the boundaries between individuals and the health care system is a critical step in the movement toward health care equality.¶ Tw

eedy, for instance, sees firsthand the harm inflicted on the uninsured when he works at the rural health clinic described earlier. But, even so, like Matthew, he gives insufficient attention in his book to the fact that, even with the reforms of the Affordable Care Act, we will continue to lack universal health care.[22] For instance, under current reforms, 27 million are expected to remain uninsured 10 years from now, according to an approximation of the Congressional Budget Office. We know that Hispanics and blacks are disproportionately represented among the uninsured.[23] Covering these excluded millions seems critical. Moreover, neither author discusses the fact that the US health care system imposes substantial financial burdens at the “point of use,” in the form of copayments, deductibles, and co-insurance for medical care, which may deter care for those who need it. Some have legitimately suggested that these forms of cost-sharing disproportionately harm minorities, who have lower median income and net wealth.[24] In other words, the potential harm of, say, a $2,000 medical deductible is dependent on your income and assets: those with fewer resources may lose out on important health care. And finally, though Tweedy refers to the shortcomings of Medicaid, neither he nor Matthew emphasizes that a health care system with a separate tier of access for the poor may be inherently unequal.¶ But would “true” universal health care do much to combat racial health inequalities, if it were, say, a single-payer system that eliminated out-of-pocket expenses and was equally accessible by all, without tiers or walls?[25] Or would it replicate current biases and inequalities? To some extent, the answer is yes to both questions. But even so, a body of research has suggested that, even if these biases persist, a fully universal system might nonetheless be a powerful tool in reducing racial health care inequalities. That evidence comes from what is arguably a quasi-single-payer system located in the US: the Veterans’ Administration (VA). Notwithstanding recent scandals that are indeed of great concern, the modern-era VA has justifiably earned praise for delivering a high — indeed, comparatively superior — quality of health care.[26] There is also evidence that it may indeed effectively reduce, even potentially eliminate, some racial health inequalities.¶ Last fall, a study published in Circulation, the premier journal of the American Heart Association, received wide coverage in the media for some provocative findings. “The US Veterans Health Administration (VHA),” as the study notes in its introductory section, “is a healthcare system that does not impose the typical access barriers of the US healthcare system that may disproportionately impede enrollment of blacks.” The investigators therefore hypothesized that racial inequalities in cardiovascular outcomes and mortality found in the general population might be reduced in the VA, a “healthcare system that allows enrollment independent of race or socioeconomic status.”[27] Consistent with previous studies, in their analysis of data from the general (non-VA) population, they found racial inequalities much as they expected to find them: blacks had a much higher mortality (after adjusting for various other factors) as compared to whites (indeed, approximately 40 percent to 50 percent higher).[28]¶ In striking contrast, in the VA population, even though the risk of stroke was either higher or similar among blacks as compared to whites depending on which statistical adjustments were used, the risk of coronary heart disease as well as overall death was actually lower among blacks. This is, of course, only a single study, albeit a rather large one with more than three million subjects. An accompanying editorial concedes that a number of factors may be at play. Nonetheless, the fact is that, as described by the investigators, these findings build on an existing literature consisting of multiple studies that together point to a reduction of racial health inequalities within the VA for critically important outcomes like mortality.[29]¶ No doubt, there are still discriminatory practices in some or all of these facilities, and we can assume that there are conscious or unconscious biases at work in the minds of some of its clinicians, as there are elsewhere. Indeed, other studies clearly show that, even after the significant reorganization and reform of the VA in the late 1990s, there are still racial disparities in the VA.[30] If we moved to a single-payer system on a national level, such biases would still need to be addressed along the lines Matthew argues. But the point is that a more egalitarian structure of the health care system itself might go even further in reducing them. Indeed, in light of this research, it seems fair to say that health care universalism could be a very powerful tool in combatting ubiquitous racial health inequities. Attaining health care equality, in other words, requires true equality of access. And yet this simple notion is all too often ignored entirely in any discussion of health “disparities.”

### AT Willoughby-Herard

#### Willoughby Herard agrees that the history of resistance in the face of medical racism demonstrates the malleability and nuance of medicine and anti-blackness. These historical examples evince the importance of political possibility and tactical engagement with institutions to eliminate segregation and medical discrimination

Willoughby-Herard 18 – Tiffany Willoughby-Herard, Associate Professor, African American Studies, University of California, Irvine, and Visiting Faculty Researcher, Institute for Gender Studies, University of South Africa (“(Political) Anesthesia or (Political) Memory: The Combahee River Collective and the Death of Black Women in Custody,” *Theory & Event*, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2018)

Mythologies about the imaginary capacities of the "Black body in pain" and "the Black body super-human" are central to the cultural ideologies and norms that undergird racialized medical discrimination and the sexualized violence that extends into civil society and social life through the extermination of Black Women and their reduction to mere use value. In fact, we might even argue that the social reproduction of a whitened civil society, one that continually and progressively secures substantive rights and actual liberties for white and non-Black people, relies heavily on formal and informal practices of sexualized violence against Black Women. Scholars have increasingly turned to the language of the "medical plantation" and its descendant "medical Jim Crow" to explain the proliferation of segregation and coerced medical experimentation in state-funded medical facilities for Black patients. The medical plantation was a type of plantation whose enslaved inhabitants were made available to medical researchers as models for the study of human (that is white and non-Black) biology. Health activists like W. Montague Cobb (1904–1990), head of the NAACP National Health Committee and Editor of the Journal of the National Medical Association organized a major plank of the long civil rights movement focused exclusively on that dimension of the afterlife of slavery that is more commonly known as medical discrimination. It was these health activists who organized with North Carolina medical personnel to successfully challenge segregation in state-funded medical facilities in the 1963 landmark case, Simkins vs. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. Like activists in the Black Women's Health Project28 based in Georgia and Florida just a few years later in 1984, central questions of reproduction have to do with whether, when, or if such persons would or could shoulder the weight of themselves, their families, their histories, and their memories in a world in which structural forms of violence (those forms of violence which allegedly have no origins) directed in peculiar and lasting ways at them would never even be named, mentioned, or alluded to except to shame them. These are questions of social reproduction that are basic to Black Women's lives—not the mere making of babies but, the making of black female lives that can be lived or as the collective members explained "which allows us to continue our struggle and work. [End Page 266] 29

### AT Academia

#### Academia isn’t a singular monolith – believing it is makes negative aspects inevitable and makes it impossible to engage in targeted, ethical resistance.

Heath et al. 13 – (2013, Mary Heath, Associate Professor at Flinders Law School, and Peter Burdon, Associate Professor at the Adelaide Law School, “Academic Resistance to the Neoliberal University,” 23 Legal Educ. Rev. 379, SSRN)

A Desirable Change and Ethical Resistance

Academics who identify as activists need a clear conception of who or what they are resisting. Put simply, not everything that occurs in universities is neoliberal or undesirable. The university consists of a complex assemblage of structures, values and practices. Like other social institutions, it has evolved over time with reference to the projects of individuals, political groups and other social institutions. Sometimes these forces are place-specific and sometimes they are national (or even international). Projects can also have lives of their own and are reproduced in unpredictable ways as they come together to constitute a particular institution.86 As the outcomes of our efforts and those of others become apparent, further critique and action may be called for, and our strategies and analyses of resistance may require revision.

For these reasons, we suggest that academic activists conceptualise the university as a set of practices that are historically contingent and capable of transformation. This perspective is important, first, because it brings into view the potential for alternatives to the prevailing state of legal education. In contrast, the construction of neoliberalism as ‘necessary and inevitable’ forestalls the possibility of resistance 87 and makes critique appear foolish.88 Second, it means that resistance can also be nuanced and directed at particular structures, practices or values rather than at the university or the tertiary system as a whole. This has obvious implications for the prospects of successful action and for our sense of agency as activists.

The flip side to this conceptualisation is also important. Desirable changes in legal education as well as in Australian universities have taken place during the last few decades as neoliberal practices have also become more and more embedded. As academic activists we need to choose forms of resistance that we believe are ethical and meaningful. We are in no way obliged to oppose every form of change. We might instead choose virtuous compliance with changes we think are desirable,89 or support goals we believe are desirable while opposing forms of implementation we believe are not.

#### The politics of academic refusal are a disaster – they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed ‘16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

# Block

## K

### Root Cause

#### Capitalism is the root cause

Sell ‘15 (Hannah, Socialist Party of England and Wales, sister party of Socialist Alternative, “IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST OPPRESSION” http://www.socialistalternative.org/2015/11/02/identity-politics-struggle-oppression/)

Over recent years there has been a growth in support for what can broadly be described as ‘identity politics’ among many mainly young people who are rightly angry about and radicalised by, their experience of sexism, racism, homophobia, prejudice against disabled people and other forms of oppression. In one sense, identity politics is an inevitable part of the political awakening of many members of oppressed groups within society. Recognising that you are oppressed, and that you can fight against your oppression through a common struggle with others who share the same oppression, is a vital first step.¶ However, the history of struggle against oppression shows that, on the basis of experience, those participating tend to go beyond identity politics as they recognise the root cause of their oppression lies in the structure of society. The highest point of the vast rebellion against racism in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, was reached by the Black Panthers, who were founded in 1966 with the magnificent concept: “We do not fight racism with racism. We fight racism with solidarity. We do not fight exploitative capitalism with black capitalism. We fight capitalism with basic socialism”.¶ Today, both the #BlackLivesMatter rebellion and the movement for $15 Now are the first stages of a new mass uprising against poverty and racism in the US. However, the pushing back of consciousness globally over the decades following the collapse of Stalinism in the late 1980s and the capitalist triumphalism that accompanied it, mean that the new movements did not begin where the Panthers left off, with a socialist outlook. Nonetheless, there is a growing anti-capitalist mood among young people in the US, which is a first step to drawing socialist conclusions.¶ At the same time, identity politics is many activists’ starting point. While those involved in struggle may see this mainly as a means to fight back, the form of identity politics that has emanated from the universities and has dominated over recent decades concentrates overwhelmingly on discussing personal experience of oppression rather than trying to find the means to end it.¶ This includes all the strands of identity politics that have become more prominent in recent years, such as intersectionality and privilege theory. In Britain these concepts remain little known in wider society but have become commonplace in, for example, university feminist societies. Intersectionalists argue that different oppressions ‘intersect’. Indeed, they do: a black working-class woman is triply oppressed, for example. But intersectionalists often see their role as cataloguing and describing oppressions and their intersections rather than abolishing them.¶ Supporters of ‘privilege theory’ are best known for telling people to ‘check their privilege’ during (often online) debates. The founder of privilege theory, Peggy McIntosh, argued that a white, upper-class, heterosexual man, for example, is carrying around an ‘invisible knapsack’ full of unearned privileges. The argument goes that power is not concentrated in the hands of one class, or in the state, but is spread throughout society and therefore exists in all social and interpersonal relationships. Privilege theory states that every individual is part of a multiplicity of oppressive relationships. It concentrates overwhelmingly on exhortations to individuals to change, to check their privilege.¶ But it is not possible to eliminate either oppressions or privileges merely by exhorting individuals to change their behaviour. In fact, in many countries there have been significant improvements in social attitudes to different forms of oppression in recent decades, but they have not resulted in the ending of the oppressions concerned.¶ Racism ingrained¶ In Britain, for example, while racist prejudices are still widespread, crude racist ideas are far less socially acceptable than they were 30 years ago. This has come about for a number of reasons, above all the determination and increased confidence of black and Asian people to fight discrimination and racism. Another important factor was the widespread involvement of black and Asian workers in the trade unions in a common struggle alongside white workers. Both of these factors helped to foster a strong feeling among a large section of the white population, especially youth, that racism is wrong and should be combated.¶ Nonetheless, racism remains deeply ingrained in British society. The police are up to 28 times more likely to stop and search you if you are black or Asian. The gap between average pay for white workers and those from ethnic minorities has actually increased over recent years despite an improvement in social attitudes. Over half of young black men are unemployed, more than double the unemployment rate for young white men.¶ In the US the situation is even starker. While deep-rooted racism remains there has also been an improvement in social attitudes. There has been the development of a black middle class and even a small black elite. Both processes are reflected in the election of a black man as US president. The vast majority of the black population, however, remain among the poorest and most oppressed in society, facing violent state repression. One hundred and thirty five African Americans were killed by the police in the first half of 2015 alone.¶ Racism does not just stem from individual prejudices but from something more fundamental: the nature of capitalism as it has actually developed. Malcolm X correctly declared that, “you can’t have capitalism without racism”. Capitalism, as Karl Marx famously said, came into being “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt”. (Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 31) He was referring, particularly, to the role of slavery in the accumulation of capital. With slavery came the development of all kinds of pseudo-scientific racist theories designed to justify the enslavement of African peoples. Racist ideas were then adapted to justify the colonial oppression of large parts of the world.¶ Capitalism was forced to abandon direct colonial rule as a result of the magnificent revolutionary movements that took place against it. Economic exploitation, however, is more brutal than ever. Two hundred and fifty years ago the gap between the richest and poorest countries was around five to one. Today it is 400 to one. Racism is used to justify this vast gulf and also that black workers are usually among the poorest and most oppressed sections of the working class even in the ‘rich’ countries.¶ Women’s oppression¶ Similarly, blatant sexism is no longer acceptable in the way it would have been in the past, particularly in the economically advanced capitalist countries. Women have won greater rights in recent decades. There are different factors that have led to this, including the development of improved and widely available contraception. However, many of these gains can be traced back to the growing confidence of women as a result of many more women working rather than being isolated in the home.¶ Nonetheless, women continue to be oppressed. This oppression stems, not merely from the attitudes of men, but from the role of women and the family in capitalist and earlier class societies. Most of us think of ‘the family’ as the individuals who make up our own family, who are often the people who are closest to us. Historically, however, the family as an institution has also acted within class societies as an agent of social control with the father as ‘head of the household’ having responsibility for disciplining women and children. While this concept has been weakened in the modern era by the growing confidence of women, it is far from eliminated. The idea remains deeply ingrained that women are possessions of men and that we need to be loyal and obedient to our partners, and that violence and coercion are acceptable means for men to achieve that, both towards ‘their’ women and ‘their’ children.¶ It is no longer socially acceptable to openly state that women are the possessions of men, yet these ideas were enshrined in law until relatively recently. Marital rape only became illegal in Britain in 1991, Spain in 1992, and Germany in 1997. While no longer legal or openly acceptable, marital rape is still widespread and rarely punished. It is estimated that in Britain only 15% of all rapes are reported to the police, and only 7% of those result in conviction. According to the UN, of all the women killed globally in 2012 almost half were killed by their partners or family members. In contrast, only 6% of killings with male victims were committed by intimate partners or family members.¶ At the same time, women continue to bear the brunt of domestic responsibilities despite increasingly also going out to work. In many cases women are still, as the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky put it, the ‘slaves of slaves’. While in Britain, for example, most studies show men accepting that they should do an equal amount of domestic chores as women, there is still a considerable gap between intentions and reality. One survey showed that on average women did 17 hours a week of domestic chores (excluding childcare) whereas men did less than six.¶ It is true, therefore, that men get some gain from women’s disproportionate bearing of the domestic burden, in having a few more hours leisure time. The main gain, however, is for capitalism. By putting the main burden of domestic life, the bringing up of the next generation (from which the future workforce is drawn), and caring for the sick and elderly on women, they are removed from the responsibility of society as a whole.¶ Power concentrated in the capitalist class¶ To suggest that power is not concentrated in one class is to completely misunderstand the nature of capitalism. Today, wealth and power is concentrated in fewer hands – the owners of the major banks and corporations – even than when Marx was writing. According to Oxfam, the richest 85 people on earth – a double-decker bus full – have as much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population. The richest 85 include five women and one African, although white men predominate. Their role in society, however, does not stem primarily from their colour or gender but that they are part of a tiny super-wealthy ruling elite.¶ The world’s 100 biggest companies now control 70% of global trade. Even if their boards of directors included many more black people or women it would not make any material difference to the exploitation suffered by the working class and poor worldwide, not least black women. Look at South Africa, where the incorporation of a tiny minority of blacks into the capitalist class has made no difference to the dire poverty suffered by the majority. And capitalism is increasingly incapable of taking society forward. Many of the rights partially taken for granted by previous generations in Europe, like a relatively secure job, home and pension, are now things of the past.¶ To say that social relations in modern society are capitalist relations is not to take an ‘economic determinist’ view of society: arguing that every aspect of the ‘superstructure’ of society – the state, politics, culture, social attitudes and so on – are rigidly determined by the character of the economy. On the contrary, there is an inter-relationship between the two. At the same time, politics and social attitudes reflect not only the current character of capitalism but also remnants of the past and – particularly in mass struggles of the working class and the oppressed – the seeds of a potential better future. Nonetheless, it is clear that as long as we live in a capitalist society, where wealth and power rests with the tiny elite who own and control industry, science and technology, then the superstructure of that society will also ultimately reflect and act in the interests of that ruling elite.¶ No amount of demanding that people ‘check their privilege’ will eliminate social attitudes generated and sustained by capitalism. While determined mass struggle can force capitalism to adapt to a certain extent – as has been the case with LGBT rights, equal pay legislation and other measures – permanent and deep-rooted change, particularly where it threatens the functioning of capitalism, will only be achieved by the socialist transformation of society.¶ The horrific bureaucratic degeneration and then collapse of the Soviet Union have obscured the importance of the Russian revolution in giving a glimpse of what socialism would mean for those suffering oppression. In Russia in 1917 the working class led a movement of the oppressed which successfully overthrew capitalism for the first, and so far, the only time. Russia’s extreme poverty and the isolation of the new workers’ state led to its degeneration. Nonetheless, in the early days it gave a glimpse of how a new society could overcome oppressions that had existed for millennia.¶ In ‘backward’ Russia, legal changes were introduced very quickly which were many decades ahead of any capitalist country. These included universal suffrage, civil marriage and divorce when requested by either partner, equal pay, paid maternity leave, the right to abortion and the legalisation of homosexuality. Oppressed nationalities were given the genuine right to self-determination. Measures were taken to encourage nationalities and cultures oppressed under tsarism, including the development of a written form of some languages for the first time.¶ Of course, legal or formal measures do not in themselves end oppression. Decades after the passing of equal pay legislation in Britain, for example, women still earn an average of £5,000 a year less than men. Addressing women’s oppression in the Soviet Union, Trotsky described how legal equality was a step forward but actual equality in social relations required a far more “deep-going plough”, capable of providing real economic equality and lifting the domestic burden from women, and transforming social attitudes ingrained over millennia. A whole number of measures began to be introduced in the aftermath of the Russian revolution (including free childcare, communal restaurants and public laundries) which, while never fully implemented due to the degeneration of the Soviet Union, gave a glimpse of how the domestic burden could be lifted. That, in turn, could have laid the foundations for the building of a society based on women’s equality.¶ Many intersectionalists put very little emphasis on campaigning for economic and practical measures to lift the burden on women, instead concentrating overwhelmingly on social attitudes, and trying to create spaces within society that are free of oppression. Yet freeing women from the heavy load of being the carers, cooks and cleaners for the whole of society is an essential prerequisite for ending women’s oppression. Twenty-first century capitalism, far from taking steps towards this, is driving in the opposite direction.¶ Austerity affects women severely. It includes huge cuts in public services that partially lifted some of the responsibilities that fall on women. David Cameron’s big society could be summed up as demanding that women compensate for the cuts to health, child and elderly care by taking the burden on themselves. This is a demonstration that under capitalism, even where oppressed groups make gains, they are never guaranteed to be permanent. This also applies to the devastating, sometimes life-threatening, consequences of austerity for disabled people.¶ Combating prejudice¶ Pointing out the need for fundamental change in society does not in any way downgrade the importance of combating oppressive and reactionary ideas and practices while we live in this society, including within the workers’ movement. However, this will by necessity be a constant battle. Intersectionalists call for ‘safe spaces’ with zero tolerance for anything considered an oppressive view. But it is utopian to try and create a safe space which is sealed off from the society in which we all live and are affected by. Turning inwards in order to concentrate on doing so – rather than turning out to build a movement capable of winning real change – is doomed to frustration and failure. Far from creating safe spaces, this can often lead to an undemocratic environment, where the individuals dominant in a particular ‘space’ assert that they feel oppressed by ideas and opinions they disagree with.¶ There is also a dangerous tendency to suggest that the value of someone’s contribution to a discussion should be based primarily on what oppressions they as an individual suffer from. This is completely false. Britain’s first and only female prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, undoubtedly suffered individual oppression as a woman, but the neo-liberal programme she drove through was completely against the interests of working-class women. Recently, Jeremy Corbyn, the new left leader of the Labour Party, has been attacked supposedly for not having enough women in his shadow cabinet, although his front bench is the first that has been majority women. More women voted for Corbyn than for the other right-wing candidates (two of whom were women) in the leadership election because he stood against austerity. Had he chosen a pro-austerity woman as shadow chancellor rather than the left MP, John McDonnell, most of the women who voted for him would have correctly been deeply disappointed.¶ The issue of safe spaces also relates to intersectionalists’ views on gender: that the concept of two genders is a social construct and, in reality, gender is more like a spectrum. Emphasis is often put on supporting transgender people and all those who rebel against societal gender constraints. This includes some who do not identify as either male or female but as ‘gender-non-conforming’. This reflects a positive rejection of current gender relations and homophobia by a growing number of young people. Socialists, of course, support the democratic right of individuals to define both their own gender and sexuality. However, while there is radicalisation among an important layer on this issue, that does not mean it is possible to create, as some intersectionalists attempt, spaces within capitalist society completely free from societal pressures regarding gender.¶ Capitalism shapes the outlook of all of us from the time we are born, with all of the distortions of the human personality that creates. This includes how we are expected to behave appropriately for our given gender. It is not possible to fully escape this; in this society capitalist gender roles are an objective reality. Even rejecting capitalist gender norms means reacting to, and therefore being affected by, those norms. It is not possible to prescribe exactly how human relations, including the role of gender, would flower in the future when freed from the rigid straitjackets imposed by capitalism.¶ The role of the working class¶ The crucial issue for anyone determined to end oppression, therefore, is how to end capitalism and begin to build a world that is free of oppression: a ‘safe space’ for all. Today, just as when Marx described the working class as the ‘grave digger of capitalism’, it is the key force on the planet capable of ridding us of this bankrupt system. Both privilege theory and intersectionality would list social class – what they would describe as ‘classism’ – as one form of oppression. However, it features as one item on a list and is often discussed in terms of the prejudice people face because of having a working-class accent or postcode. The centrality of class in the structure of society is not recognised. The basic idea that a Nigerian worker would have more in common with a worker in Britain or the US than they would with Aliko Dangote, the only African to make it on to the list of the richest 85 on the planet, would not be understood. The fact that it is the working class that is ultimately responsible for the creation of the capitalists’ profits and that by collective action it is capable of bringing capitalist society to a halt is discounted as outmoded.¶ Yet the working class is not ‘disappearing’. In fact, it is potentially stronger today than it was at the time of the Russian Revolution. Many countries where workers were a tiny minority of society a century ago now have large and powerful working classes. In the economically advanced countries, like Britain, deindustrialisation has meant that the industrial working class is much smaller. However, there still remain groups of workers with enormous power to bring society a halt when they strike – anyone who lives in London and witnessed the recent London Underground strikes knows that. Deindustrialisation has not led to young people becoming ‘middle class’, but has forced them into low paid, temporary work, often in the service sector. At the same time, large sections of the population – including teachers and civil servants – who would have previously considered themselves middle class have been driven down into the ranks of the working class in their living conditions and social outlook.¶ The history of the 20th century repeatedly demonstrated the preparedness of working-class people to fight for socialism. However, it also demonstrated that the capitalist class does all it can to cling to power, not least by attempting to divide and rule by turning different sections of the working class against each other.¶ In recent years, there has been increasing radicalisation and struggle globally, including revolutionary movements. Out of these, largely unsuccessful, struggles conclusions will begin to be drawn about what is necessary to change society. That requires a mass revolutionary movement, bringing together different sections of the working class – with different experiences and outlooks – in a mass party with a clear programme and a determined and accountable leadership.¶ Such a party would not be a model of a new society, but a tool to bring it about. Nonetheless, it is crucial that such a mass party would include in its ranks all of the most oppressed sections of the working class and that it is a vibrant and democratic force in which all participants feel able to express their views. Its programme, as was the case with the Bolsheviks in Russia, has to fight for the rights not just of the working class in general but also for different specifically oppressed groups.¶ Undoubtedly, such a movement would also win the support of wide sections of the middle class and even individuals from the capitalist class who saw the need for a break with capitalism. This would particularly include those who suffer oppression under capitalism and who recognise that the only way to end homophobia, racism or women’s oppression is to join the struggle for a new society.¶ Struggle itself unifies¶ It would be ludicrous and deplorable to argue that those fighting their particular oppression should hold back and ‘wait’ for a unified struggle of the whole working class. Mass struggle is a thousand times more effective than exhortations to individuals to change their attitudes in winning social progress. It is always the case that a movement has a greater chance of success if it is able to reach out to other sections of the working class, and that therefore it is important that the programme put forward by a particular movement attempts to do this. However, that is in no way to suggest that any group should artificially delaying fighting back until they, for example, convince more white or male workers of their cause.¶ Nonetheless, to permanently end racism in the US, for instance, will require ending capitalism and will therefore have to involve a struggle uniting different sections of the working class – black, Hispanic, Asian and white. This is a practical question. The African American population, who suffer the worst police racism, are 13% of the population and will not be able to win alone. The capitalist class will try to increase divisions between different sections of the oppressed, particularly at times of heightened struggle. The oppressed need to increase their strength by trying to maximise unity. The $15 Now movement in the US, and the election of Socialist Alternative member Kshama Sawant in Seattle, give a glimpse of the growing possibilities in the US to build a united workers’ movement.¶ Achieving unity does not mean downplaying the importance of combating the specific oppressions different groups in society face. On the contrary, it is vital that socialists campaign for the workers’ movement to fight to take up every aspect of oppression. The Socialist Party has a proud history of doing this – for example, spearheading the Campaign Against Domestic Violence in the 1990s which was central to getting the trade unions to take the issue up.¶ Intersectionality on university campuses in Britain has had a tendency to turn campus feminist societies inwards, focusing on a fruitless attempt to grade degrees of oppression rather than fighting to end it. However, many of those initially attracted to these ideas are searching for a way to change society and will quickly come up against the limits of identity politics in all its forms.¶ One small indication of this is the popularity among young people of the film Pride, which tells the true story of Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners (LGSM). LGSM recognised the common ground between their struggle against the Tories and that of the 1984/85 miners’ strike. Their attempt to support the miners was not without difficulties – with prejudices on both sides – but ultimately forged a real unity. LGSM understood that a victory for the miners would have been a massive defeat for Thatcher, the Tories and the capitalist class – and that was in the interests of LGBT people. They never once responded to white, straight miners, who were often initially homophobic, by telling them to ‘check their privilege’. One result of their heroic efforts was big parts of the workers’ movement wholeheartedly taking up the struggle for LGBT liberation, including National Union of Mineworkers lodges from across the country leading the 1985 Pride demonstration.¶ The miners’ strike was a major event in the class struggle in Britain, but it will be dwarfed by events that will take place in the future against the background of a crisis-ridden capitalism trying to drive the living standards of the majority into the dirt. For some intersectionalists it will require witnessing the power of the working class in action in order for them to draw the conclusion that the route to ending their specific oppression is not as part of fragmented separate groupings but by throwing their lot in with the class struggle. However, growing numbers of young people, particularly when they become active in concrete struggles, are already being attracted to socialist ideas as the only way to achieve real liberation for all humanity.

### Links

#### Hacking link/divestment

**Bluhdorn 07** – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the established patterns of self-construction, which thus have to be defended and further developed at any price, have fundamental problems attached to them: ﬁrstly, the attempt to constitute, on the basis of product choices and acts of consumption, a Self and identity that are distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms. Secondly, late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption cherished by advanced modern societies cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, in their struggle against self-referentiality and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, late-modern societies are thus locked into the imperative of maintaining and further developing the principle of exclusion (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend a lifestyle that requires **ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies**.14 For this effort, military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means. Nevertheless, the principle of exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it directly contradicts the modernist notion of the free and autonomous individual that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time.

If considered within this framework of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, the signiﬁcance of late-modern societies’ discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident. At a stage when the possibility and desirability of transcending the principle of exclusion has been pulled into radical doubt but when, at the same time, the principle of inclusion is vitally important, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, latemodern society reconciles the tension between the cherished but exclusive status quo – for which there is no alternative – and the non-existent inclusive alternative – on whose existence it depends – **by means of simulation**. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. They are an indispensable function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but **because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality**. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion.

Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative discourses of radical change in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements provide an **arena for** the physical expression and experience of the **authenticity and reality of the alternative**

### AT Jain

#### Jain votes neg—first and last paragraph of the article, which they left out of their card

Jain 17 (Uday, PhD student at University of Chicago, MA (Hons) Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, “White Marxism: A Critique of Jacobin Magazine” 8/11/17 https://newsocialist.org.uk/white-marxism-critique/)

This critique comes from a place of solidarity. As this is a critical moment to reassess the history and present of international socialism and imagine a new path forward – many new paths forward – it is absolutely crucial to get the basics of this reassessment right. Jacobin have done a remarkable job in bringing together a large Internet public from around the world, but especially in the US and Europe, and have offered many strong interventions against the ideology of neoliberal centrism on a variety of issues. They have successfully built up a small, but growing, and quite active socialist public sphere consisting of many who would previously have been apolitical, and for that their efforts must be commended. They also routinely publish a variety of perspectives from within today’s international, disparate, and ideologically heterogeneous “Left”; and so maintain this public sphere through a spirited and necessary debate. And yet, as Jacobin have developed a certain overall line on contemporary politics, and inasmuch as they publicise this line through self-consciously provocative interventions in social media on various issues; sharp, comradely, even polemical critique on this line from a fellow Leftist must surely be welcome. The Jacobin community can only be strengthened when it can face, answer, and grow from serious critiques about its faults and missteps. The ability to listen to good-faith critiques and learn from one’s mistakes is central to any successful political movement – and it is a political movement that Jacobin aims to inspire. It is in this spirit I propose the following thesis. As long as the emergent Jacobin-centred public sphere refuses to seriously engage with what they have derisively termed “identity” politics, it will alienate the most vital sections of a twenty-first century Marxist coalition and repeat the mistakes made by white socialist movements in the Western core throughout the twentieth century. As I will discuss in the conclusion, both Corbynism in the UK, and the Jacobin-centred public sphere more broadly, have much to gain from a serious engagement with what the latter have derisively termed “identitarian Leftism”. Foregrounding the histories, victories, and struggles of indigenous, Black, queer, feminist, disabilities, and migrant movements and how they have successfully theorized and contested patriarchal, racial, capitalist, and imperialist hierarchies only deepens a socialist analysis and ensures that the failures of exclusionary, one-dimensional forms of organising are not repeated. I use the term Jacobin-centred public sphere advisedly. The magazine’s wide range of published work includes a range of positions on race, gender, and class that can’t easily be categorized as being simply for or against identity politics as such. Yet, a sense remains – one that is substantiated by the tone and the content of strong polemical interventions by Vivek Chibber, Walter Benn Michaels, Nivedita Majumdar, and Adolph Reed - that one story that Jacobin is always ready to tell is the story of the apparent betrayal of class politics by an American “Identitarian Left”. The Fable of the Non-identitarian and identitarian Left The story goes something like this. There was once a non-identitarian left, a Left in America that emphasized nothing but class, that picked only the right battles and won them. This Left had its heyday in the unionist movements from the 1920s to the 1940s and brought about many of the victories of FDR’s New Deal. It had all the strengths of a trade-unionist organization. It was working-class, firm, strong, and decisive. Then starting in the 1960s, with the cultural revolution and the emergence of a theoretically prolix post-modernism, a demonic identity politics emerged fully-formed – ready to be appropriated by the bourgeoisie and destroy this powerful class-first Left once and for all. These New Leftists got so obsessed with philosophical and literary speculation about cultural oppression that they lost track of the real issues. So keyed into ‘intersectionality’ were these identitarians that vigourous contestation against the boss fell by the wayside. In fact, Michaels suggests, this obsession with identity was a way for these ‘Leftists’ to mask their own complicity with the bourgeois ruling class in its legitimation of a diversified capitalism. These New Leftists retreated to the academy, conjuring up ever more intricate and complex critiques of capitalism without ever offering a clear picture of how to fight it. Chibber adds that the misfortune of “social theory classes” in the last twenty-five years has been to make Leftists too obsessed with “margins”, misunderstanding the centrality of the working-class as a revolutionary subject. And so these Jacobin contributors – often promoted and foregrounded in the Jacobin public sphere - registered their profound intellectual and political disagreement with the post-1960s academic and political Left. Intersectional thought, cultural politics, identity politics, all of these tendencies fragmented a united Left by focusing on the fragments and the margins. They created a Left too theory-minded to understand the bloody realities of capturing power. These elitist “identitarian” academics and activists, born of the 1960s cultural revolutions, are held responsible for misunderstanding the basics of a Marxist class war and running the “Left” into a cul-de-sac that they deserve to stay in if they keep insisting on their current modes of thought and action. The role of Jacobin or at least these rather polemical interventions in the Jacobin pages is to bring class back, to make the “Left” Left again, to make the “Left” great again; and get us going on the march to working-class victory. White Marxism? The elisions and confusions entailed in this anti-identitarian story go a long way in explaining why in many radical circles Jacobin is now seen, fairly or unfairly, as a white socialist magazine. A magazine intent on erasing all the historic gains made by feminists, Black, and indigenous radical movements in favour of a reductionist, white-centric politics that harks back to a supposed golden age of the 1940s [1]. First of all, words have meaning. When such senior academics and activists as Michaels, Reed, Chibber, and Majumdar go out of their way to single out “intersectionality”, frames of analysis that focuses on the “margins”, and questions of “identity” as responsible for the comprehensive abatement of class politics in the American left, they can’t but be aware that they are not so subtly pinning the responsibility for this failure on Black feminists. After all, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s famous article, on how Black women’s experiences of male violence are conditioned by specific intersections of racism and sexism in American society, an analysis then missed in antiracist and feminist debates, was titled “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color”. Intersectionality as a political and intellectual project was developed by Black women scholars and activists to address the simple fact that as Black women, they are materially exploited, excluded, and subject to violence, due to distinct hierarchical structures that are largely ignored by a white, patriarchal, and racial capitalist society. In fighting and naming this oppression, they necessarily had to complicate easy unities of a given working-class identity, or even a unified Black experience to lay out precisely how patriarchal violence and racial capitalism affected Black women distinctly from how it affected white men, how it exploited Black working-class women differently from how it exploited white working-class men. If one reads anything in the Black feminist canon, such as books and articles by Audre Lorde, bell hooks, Angela Davis, Patricia Hill Collins, or Kimberlé Crenshaw, and this is not mentioning the hundreds of thousands of other scholars and activists who continue this work, one can scarcely get a sense that they are uninterested in class or have backgrounded capitalism and class politics for a simplistic “identitarianism”. One wonders if those who propound this anti-Identitarian line have actually read a word of Black feminist literature at all. Idealist Fables Second, this anti-Identitarian fable is a profoundly idealist, and as such is an anti-Marxist, analysis of the history of the last sixty years. It presumes that the battle between labour and capital was won entirely by capital in the academies of the Western core. In this story, somehow simultaneously, Stuart Hall, Selma James, Silvia Federici, Robin D. G. Kelley, Judith Butler, and scores of other leading Leftists around the world nefariously invented post-modernism to fit the ideological requirements of neoliberalism and thus convinced their many students to stop fighting capital and instead take up fighting endless social media wars about culture and popular representations of identity. The contempt one must have for feminists’ essential work on describing the mutual imbrication of patriarchy and capitalism – of the central role of gender in capitalist society’s division of labour and its extraction of surplus value by rendering childcare and housework unpaid – to make this case is startling. On the one hand, the story completely misses the foundational new insights and frameworks that so many Marxists in so many different spaces and countries developed in understanding the racial, gendered, and imperial dimensions of modern capitalism. Dimensions that actively hinder worker-solidarity and worker-leadership and that must be understood to sustain any successful revolutionary politics. On the other hand, it deeply misunderstands the history of the post-1960s class struggle. Neoliberalism didn’t win because post-modernism hypnotized the Western core’s middle classes into somnolence. Neoliberalism won because the ruling classes fought and fought with the might of the state. Neoliberalism also won because the social-democratic parties that the middle-classes of the Western core continued to vote for essentially gave up on their working-class constituencies. Social-democratic parties that were supported by unions representing a labour aristocracy more interested in maintaining a nationalist class compromise with large firms than challenging the racial, gendered, and imperialist relations of expropriation which sustained Western economic growth. In the US, the Democratic party went on to break unions, retrenched the welfare state, perpetuated a racial backlash to Black power in the 1960s in the form of brutal mass incarceration, and undertook permanent war in the political-economic peripheries to shore up imperial value-chains. The very scholars and organizers who most astutely theorized, identified and enacted important acts of rebellion to halt the advance of heterosexist patriarchal imperialist capitalism – as bell hooks puts it - come under fire from Jacobin radicals for missing class altogether. The Freedom to make inconvenient Arguments? Now, those in the Jacobin public sphere who hold these views have responded to these critiques in two ways. One, they say that all the people named above are people of colour, and so to critique these academics as perpetuating a “white socialism” is to erase their identity and thus perpetuate a new form of erasure of POC views that are apparently “inconvenient” for most radicals. This is a bad-faith critique, because if the Jacobin public-sphere is against the confusions of identity politics altogether, then why put forward the identities of these scholars as relevant to the discussion at all? Presumably, this is to get at the arbitrariness and meaningless of one’s identity positions in trying to explain one’s political positions, and that a clean line cannot be drawn from the former to the latter. That to describe a person of colour’s political analysis as “white” is to deny them the freedom to make inconvenient arguments. But if race, gender, and empire are central dimensions of contemporary capitalist exploitation, and we have seen above a series of writers who seem interested in minimizing these dimensions for a nationalist class-first analysis; the consequences of such an analysis are that by being blind to how class itself is racialized and gendered, it would fail to question the very hierarchies people of colour and feminists are trying to fight. Second, some in the Jacobin public sphere respond by lumping together feminists on the radical left and radical people of colour who make these substantial critiques with centrists and contemporary neoliberals who have weaponised a superficial politics of representation as a single, all-powerful group: the Identitarian left. Once again, any knowledge of the history of the Black, feminist, and LGBTQ movements in the US will yield the simple fact that they have been and continue to be heavily contested between liberal reformist and radical Marxist currents - among many others - and that no generalization can be made about these large mobilizations as inherently neo-liberal. These puzzling arguments merely heighten the sense that such anti-identitarian critiques are woefully under-theorised and are perhaps made to incite controversy and anger more than thought and action. The fact of the matter is that Jacobin’s politics are already intersectional to some degree. That they consistently foreground the work of leading scholars and activists from all of the “identitarian” movements suggests that they implicitly presuppose the radical victories that identity politics has won for the radical Left: the inclusion of women, people of colour, indigenous people, lesbian, gay, trans and queer people, and a principled international solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles around the world at the heart of radical politics. There seems to be no need to prosecute this clumsy culture-war against such a poorly defined identitarianism per se, especially one that pointedly appears to erase the significant contributions that Black feminists have made in theorizing and organizing large communities against neoliberalism; most recently in leading the Movement for Black Lives and bringing forward prison abolition as a central struggle in the fight against racial capitalism. Words have meaning, and they have consequences. Continuing to deplore “the margins” as a frame of analysis and insisting on an imagined working-class unity will only continue to antagonize those on the Left who have long been organizing against patriarchal imperialist racial capitalism and will continue to do so, with or without certain Jacobin contributors’ seal of approval on the effectiveness of their politics. Practical Consequences What are some other practical consequences of this line of analysis? One, it is perniciously false on its own terms and refuses to engage seriously with radical queer, feminist, Black, and internationalist political movements that have continued to contest patriarchal racial capitalism in the last forty years: from forcing American civil society, the state, insurance, and pharmaceutical industries to address the treatment of HIV/AIDS, to materially denting the ability of Israel to carry out business and promote apologia for its apartheid regime around the world, to building coalitions with prisoners that bring together violently policed working-class Black and Latino communities in deindustrialized cities (as Ruth Wilson Gilmore documents in “Golden Gulag”). Indeed, the recent legislative victory of forcing Republican senators to vote against their own healthcare bill was secured to a large extent by the courage and steadfast mobilization of disability rights campaigners in the past year. Through personal testimonies and consistently disruptive direct action, they have made it clear that Trump’s healthcare bill is going to kill them; that their illnesses incur medical costs which they are not able to pay, that the rise in insurance premiums will be fatal. The lens of disability and race forcing us to confront the fact that capitalist healthcare is eugenics. If one tries to explain these victories as either identitarian reformism on the one hand, or inadequate grasps at class struggle on the other; one misses the significantly novel ways in which they have helped form radical communities that make a working-class rather than presume one. Finally, in failing to be internationalist, this kind of class-first analysis – one which relies on a notion of an accepted common sense which any socialist politics should effectively mobilize (a notion usefully criticized in this piece in New Socialist) fails to challenge pervasive white-supremacist and bourgeois ideas about who it is that constitutes a worker, and who a foreign parasite, who it is that can govern themselves and who needs to be policed, or deported. The temptation to mobilize what appears so obviously “working-class angst” without interrogating how it is racialized and gendered or whether the targets are capitalists and not migrant workers is something UK Labour has consistently struggled with before and during the era of Blairism. In recent comments, Jeremy Corbyn offered a plainly false argument that it was the “wholesale importation” of Central European workers which destroyed labour conditions in the construction industry. As Maya Goodfellow argues here, migration doesn’t bring down wages, union-busting does. Further, Corbyn’s comments, like much discussion around Brexit, made no mention of non-EU nationals: Asian and African migrants living in the UK. Support for Leave and more broadly, support for “controls on immigration” is to a measurable degree driven by racial animus towards non-European migrants. A socialist Labour movement must respond by challenging these sentiments on the level of ideology and putting forth a clear legislative agenda for abolishing Theresa May’s (and Tony Blair’s) brutal Home Office and its ICE-like incarceration and deportation regime. Engaging meaningfully with disabilities-rights, queer, feminist, Black, indigenous, and migrant struggles ensures that these lazy concessions to a racist, capitalist common sense don’t happen. Further, as Corbyn has exemplarily demonstrated in his parliamentary career, in a way that Jacobin has often been equivocal, to say the least, foregrounding the history and present of American and European empire in invading and impoverishing Caribbean, Latin American, Asian, and African nations is absolutely essential to ensure that socialism in the core that does not rest content as a socialism for the core. Going forward, Corbynism, and the American socialists inspired by Jacobin, will only grow from a pluralist commitment to these multiple fronts. Corbynism can be a vital force in dismantling the imperialist ideological and economic structures sustaining British political economy and culture: for instance, by instituting reparations to the many countries in the Third World for the country’s crimes.